THE POLITICS OF TRANSLATING THE ARAB SPRING:

TRANSLATION AS AN AGENCY TO CONTEST AUTHORITARIANISM IN MENA

A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION

BY

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# Abstract

The MENA region has witnessed unprecedented political and social events that started with a youth revolt in Tunisia in December 2010 and was followed by a series of uprisings spanning the whole region in the following months. Historians, political scientists and sociologists have attempted to study this so-called 'Arab Spring' each from their disciplinary perspective; however, few, if none, of these perspectives has paid considerable attention to the linguistic dynamics of the peculiar nature of this conflict and the role translation has played in it. As a translation scholar and the translator of one of the very first accounts on the Arab Spring namely the anthology: *Revolution, Revolt, and Reform in North Africa: The Arab Spring and Beyond* from English into Arabic, I comparatively study the Arab Spring as a story drawing on narrative theory to advance recent research at the intersection between translation and conflict. This is an exclusive translator's commentary on his work discussing the politics of translating 'the Arab Spring'. The discourse of this scholarly work may be described as a descriptive, poststructuralist, and postmodernist study of translation. It argues for the role of the translator as a social actor.

In writing this critical introduction for my translation, I have found narrative theory to be a dynamic, vigorous and disruptive approach. The conceptual framework of narrativity makes it possible to escape the limiting paradigm of considering translation as a linear and static expression in which the translator is invisible. Its lexicon also provides a sophisticated toolkit to investigate the translational phenomena more concretely than

most theoretical abstract methodologies. Moreover, engaging with the recent advances of narrative theory in translation studies is reciprocally enriching as it questions the traditional concepts in translation while it sharpens the theory's tools and keep it in constant progress. While my work is not the first application of narrativity in translation studies, my dissertation is a response to recent relevant scholarship and an attempt to advance the theory itself. 'The Arab Spring' as a case study is also an unprecedented topic to be explored both in translation studies and narrative theory.

My research concludes that not only was narrativity an inescapable means through which the world came to experience the Arab Spring, but also narratives were the guiding force in determining its actors' actions. This import, which was largely political, made the role of translators and interpreters unprecedently critical as the agency of translation is argued to be responsible for the circulation and construction of narratives and for giving them currency and legitimacy. The real-life consequences of narrativity also turn translators into social actors whose role can be leveraged in the areas of activism and resistance of hegemony and authoritarianism. While the outcome of the uprisings in MENA fell short of the label 'spring', the unveiled power of translation-mediated-and-constructed narratives augurs well for a real spring to come in the region. It is when ordinary people take responsibility for the construction of their own stories and through mundane practices share them collectively and give them currency institutionally that the myths behind the legitimacies, whether religious, revolutionary or otherwise, of the post-independence MENA authoritarian regimes start to erode and eventually collapse. In reclaiming such responsibility, the agency of translation proves to be a catalyst of change.

TO MY BELOVED PARENTS

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**APPLYING NARRATIVE THEORY TO THE ARAB SPRING**

**Summary of the Book**

*Summary*

The book *Revolution, Revolt, and Reform in North Africa: The Arab Spring and Beyond* is an anthology edited by Ricardo René Larémont, professor of political science and sociology at SUNY, Binghamton. First published in 2014, it provides "… an account of the recent revolutions or reform movements that constituted part of the Arab Spring…" as Larémont puts it on the book cover, and he considers it, "One of the first attempts at undertaking an analysis of possible transitions to democracy in the region…". The book has eight chapters: chapter 1 as an introduction, chapter 2 on the background of the uprisings by Larémont, chapter 3 on Tunisia by Amira Aleya-Sghaier, chapter 4 on Egypt by Emad El-Din Shahin, chapter 5 on Libya by Youssef M. Sawani, chapter 6 on Morocco by Mohammed Darif, chapter 7 on Algeria by Azzedine Layachi, and chapter 8 as a conclusion by Larémont. There is also an index in the end of the book.

The Arabic translation of the book entitled *al-Rabī' al-'Arabī, al-intifāḍah wa-al-iṣlāḥ wa-al-thawrah* (*The Arab Spring: the Intifada, Reform and Revolution*) was conducted by Lotfi Zekraoui and co-edited by Larémont and Sawani except the translation of chapter 6 on Morocco that was delegated to Khalid Bekkaoui to meet initial publishing deadlines. Published before the source English version in February 2013, it has an introduction and 7 chapters. The sequence of the chapters underwent a slight change by labelling the source's chapter 1 an introduction and rearranging the chapters on Morocco

and Algeria (ultimate in the source and penultimate in the translation). Chapter 7 is the concluding chapter in the Arabic version and it was co-edited by Larémont, Sawani, Darif and Layachi. Moreover, this chapter was produced at a later stage and it was not the translation of the source's concluding chapter 8. These changes in the Arabic version were not made by the translator, but they were not inconsequential nevertheless.

*Overall Thesis*

Larémont explained in his introduction that, "What has occurred in North Africa we define as *political revolutions* rather than *social revolutions*." (2). Written three months after the translation of the other chapters, with the benefit of hindsight, his introduction managed to provide a clearer analytical framework for the understanding of the uprisings. His definition of political revolutions rested upon the three categories: revolt, coup d'état and mass demonstrations (3). However, neither the original chapters nor their translation, written in the thick of mass revolt, benefited from the luxury of hindsight and concomitant translation a couple of months earlier. So, the analysis of the five contributors in their accounts did not have such clear categorical distinctions because the outcome of the uprisings was still unknown; however, their lexical choices spoke implicitly in favor of a larger scale social change, which I perceived while translating as a sort of advocacy at least in the chapters of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Moreover, it could have been an unjustifiable disservice to the youth in revolt if the contributors adopted an attitude in their accounts that was too cautious to the point of downplaying the unprecedented uprisings while at their peak. Therefore, my translation needed to reflect these lexical choices and the sequence of the source's production.

*How it was collected*

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The sequence of my translation production started in May 2012 by translating a survey on the religious and political issues of the Tunisian youth from Arabic into English, which Larémont used in drafting chapter 2 on the background to the North African revolutions. The translation into Arabic of chapters 2 and 3 took place in June, chapter 4 in July, and chapters 5, 6 and 7 in August. Chapter 1 is Larémont's new introduction that appeared in late November of the same year. The Arabic translation saw the light with the addition of a concluding chapter, chapter 7 in the Arabic version, edited by Larémont and Sawani whereas the source English version came out with the addition of a concluding chapter, chapter 8 in the English version, edited by Larémont in August 2013. This sequence determined the production specificity of my translation insofar as it had to reflect the context of the source being produced in the midst of the 'revolutions'. In other words, if the translation of the English version into Arabic has been conducted after the publication of the source, the translation would have inevitably framed the target according to new temporal settings that construct different narratives about the 'revolutions'. This production specificity of my translation also demonstrates what Venuti called "the relative autonomy of translation" insofar as it represents the intricate network of connections among the contributors, editors, the translator and publishing requirements (815).

*Placement in time*

The writing and translation of the anthology took place concomitantly at a time the uprisings were fast unfolding. Without the benefit of hindsight and due to the uncertainty of the uprisings' outcome at that time, the translation of the source was time-sensitive and agency demanding. While one may have expected the source authors to be cautious about describing what was taking place on the ground, the source was not necessarily so. Amid

the competing Arab Spring narratives disseminated by international media, the contributors of the source chapters were not disengaged from the process of elaborating the narratives that served most their writing agendas, hence, as a translator, I had to change hats to serve the contributor's agenda in my translation.

The challenge of translating a writing about a political event, particularly one the outcome of which is still uncertain, lies in the assessment of how representative the narratives are of the events on the ground. This is demonstrated by the different manifestations of 'the real' events across the linguistic boundaries, which highlights the relevance of this challenge in translation. The events of the Arab Spring were devoid of meaning without their narratives in international media and academic works such as the anthology at hand, so translating these 'representative' narratives or referencing an embedded historic event based on a specific historic moment were subject to my agency and assessment as the translator. My awareness of these implications made my translation a process of narrative construction, mediation and rewriting. I will illustrate this process after providing background on my narrative approach.

*Relevant Background of the Contributors*

Beyond the biographies of the contributors laid out in the book and their academic qualifications that can be found on the websites of the institutions they are currently affiliated with, it is worth to mention some aspects of their backgrounds that are pertinent to the argument of the critical introduction of my translation. The awareness of these aspects steered the process of my decision making while conducting the translation. Aleya-Sghaier was a witness and an activist during the Tunisian uprising, so I did not take his advocacy of the Tunisian uprising for granted. Shahin's unwavering pro-democracy

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stances are internationally recognized and garnered the support of his international fellows when he was accused with many charges in 2014 and sentenced to death in absentia in 2015 under the presidency of Egypt's Abdel Fatah el-Sisi whose regime Shahin never ceased to try and delegitimize. Sawani is a Libyan with over 30-year experience teaching in the University of Tripoli. Darif is known in Morocco for his outspoken advocacy of social justice.[1] Layachi is also an insider of Algeria whose education and early career took place at a turbulent time in the country, which he narrated vividly in his chapter. Finally, Larémont's expertise in North African politics, political Islam, the Sahel region and the relations of the United States with the MENA region gave his analysis unique comparative dimensions. The consideration of these aspects was important in the elaboration of the narratives of my translation and informed my decisions down to the word choice.

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[1] For the complete interview with Mohamed Darif see http://www.maghress.com/fr/financesnews/3563

**Narrative approach**

In writing this critical introduction for my translation, I have found narrative theory to be a dynamic, vigorous and disruptive approach. The conceptual framework of narrativity makes it possible to escape the limiting paradigm of considering translation as a linear and static expression in which the translator is invisible. Its lexicon also provides a sophisticated toolkit to investigate the translational phenomena more concretely than most theoretical abstract methodologies. Moreover, engaging with the recent advances of narrative theory in translation studies is reciprocally enriching as it questions the traditional concepts in translation while it sharpens the theory's tools and keep it in constant progress. While my work is not the first application of narrativity in translation studies, my dissertation is a response to recent relevant scholarship and an attempt to advance the theory itself. 'The Arab Spring' as a case study is also an unprecedented topic to be explored both in translation studies and narrative theory.

In her seminal work: *Translation and Conflict: A Narrative Account*, Mona Baker introduced the application of narrative theory in translation studies. Her monograph's underpinning concept is that, "...narrative constitutes reality rather than merely representing it…" (5). She defines narratives as, "…dynamic entities; they change in subtle or radical ways as people experience and become exposed to new stories on a daily basis." (3). Thus, the added value of applying narrative theory in translation studies is that it "…allows us to examine the way in which translation features in the elaboration of

narratives that cut across time and texts." (4). This version of narrative, she claims, is "elaborated in social and communication theory, rather than in narratology or linguistics, to explore the way in which translation and interpreting participate in these processes." (3). Applying narrative theory to the discussion of my translation of the Arab Spring refocuses my concerns from rendering factual accounts to the reconfiguration of the uprisings as a story through translation. Moreover, conducting a comparative study of the multiple ways the story of the Arab Spring could have been told or how it was told differently across the linguistic boundaries will unveil the specificities of the agency of translation.

Baker structured her work around a typology of four kinds of narratives: ontological, public, conceptual and meta-narratives, and highlighted eight features of how narratives work drawing on Jerome Bruner's work *The Narrative Construction of Reality*. These features are: temporality, relationality, causal emplotment, selective appropriation, particularity, genericness, normativeness and narrative accrual. In addition to this typology, Baker explained the broad notion of framing as "…an active strategy that implies agency and by means of which we consciously participate in the construction of reality." (106). Finally, Baker drew on Walter Fisher's *The Narrative Paradigm: In the Beginning* to address the issue of "how we assess narratives to decide whether we should subscribe to them, dissociate ourselves from those who subscribe to them, or even actively set out to challenge them…" (141). This structure proved useful in dissecting narratives elaborated in situations of violent conflict which were Baker's main concern and served as a model for possible subsequent studies. Her model, however, was subject to revision in the work of Sue-Ann Harding's *News as Narrative: Reporting and Translating the 2004 Beslan Hostage Disaster* and it is still susceptible for possible advancements. My application of

narrative theory to the Arab Spring aims at investigating its narratives as a situation of conflict and how considering the uprisings as stories influenced my decisions while producing the translation. My investigation also attempts to further revise the theory in response to the specificities of my case.

**Introducing narrative typology**

Mona Baker drew on the works of Margaret Somers and Gloria Gibson to apply their elaborated four-category narrative typology to translation studies. While the purpose of Somers and Gibson was to "to outline the social functions and political import of narrativity" (28), Baker noted that their work, "p[aid] no attention at all to translation and interpreting, nor to discursive issues more broadly." (28). Therefore, Baker's *Translation and Conflict: A Narrative Account* was the first attempt to illustrate how the four narrative categories: ontological, public, conceptual and meta-narratives operate in the context of translation. In what follows, I attempt to explore the application of this typology to my specific case of translating the Arab Spring within the confines of the anthology I translated and discuss its discursive issues.

Figure 1. Somers and Gibson's Typology



*Ontological narratives*

The first category of narratives is what Somers and Gibson call ontological and Baker refers to as personal. These narratives, in the words of Baker, "are personal stories

that we tell ourselves about our place in the world and our own personal history." (28). However, personal narratives and collective narratives are inextricable, which makes "…even a concrete personal story told in one language cannot necessarily be retold or translated into another language unproblematically." (28). This insight motivated me to investigate the different expressions of the Arab Spring personal stories such as the protesters' accounts between English and Arabic and explore their connections to shared and larger narratives.

The interdependent relationship between personal and collective narratives is of relevance to the Arab Spring narratives. Baker observes that, "Collective narratives… shape and constrain our personal stories, determining both their meanings and their possible outcomes." (28) At the same time, "… personal narratives can enhance or undermine the narratives that underpin the social order and hence interfere with the smooth functioning of society." (28). This insight foregrounds the narratives of the Arab Spring as an exploitable landscape for political ends and makes narrativity a suitable approach to investigate the Arab Spring. For instance, studying the 'official stories' of the North African regimes to legitimize their authoritarianism at the personal level and uncovering the personal stories that shook the socio-political 'order' in North Africa during the uprisings since the North African regimes used official discourse and narratives as a political instrument to construct and reinforce their legitimacy in the region as Laurie Brand convincingly argued (Brand 2014). This interdependence also demonstrates that social order is not a static state, but a dynamic one in which social institutions constantly negotiate the shared narratives to keep personal narratives from diverging. A divergent individual may instigate contagion and a viral social movement, but just like in a biological

environment the whole organism may develop immunity to nip any divergent subjects in the bud, which has been the case of the Algerian regime in managing any form of dissent since the traumatic internal war of the 90s.

One may revisit the phenomenon of social dissent as a linguistic act. It consists of the circulation of divergent narratives between the local and the global crossing geographic and linguistic boundaries, transferring their nature across multimedia platforms, and acquiring power and currency along the way. Therefore, one can explore the Arab Spring as a form of dissent that spread by circulating 'revolutionary' narratives and which heavily relied on the agency of translation for its global reach.

*Public narratives*

The second category in the typology is public narratives that Baker defines as, "… stories elaborated by and circulating among social and institutional formations larger than the individual, such as the family,[6] religious or educational institution, the media, and the nation." (33). The distinction between public narratives and shared or collective narratives is that public narratives gain currency within an institution with authority. Baker mentioned the public narratives of 9/11 and the war on Iraq as examples. Similarly, some of the Arab Spring narratives may qualify as public narratives and they can be investigated by answering the questions: What happened? Why and how did it happen? Could it have been avoided? And so on. Stories advanced in response to such questions differ depending on who issued them, when they were produced and who was circulating them… etc. The choice of individuals to subscribe to one version of these stories or dissent from another also depends on variables such as the living conditions of the person. When the North African uprisings took place, it was likely that a poor person would see the uprisings as a

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true social revolution, while another person with better living conditions would subscribe to some conspiracy theory threatening his or her status. Since public narratives influence shared and personal narratives, the dominant versions of public narratives determine the course of a given event because individuals use their personal stories to think and act. For instance, the narratives of 'a revolution' taking place in Tunisia kept up the mobilization of its people, while both the Moroccan and Algerian regimes managed to keep their peoples paralyzed by spreading narratives of conspiracy theories, the risk of violent and bloody turnout of protests and the stories that idealized stability. The parties whose power relies on the dominance of a certain version of events have interest in keeping the status quo because "Public narratives circulating in any society can and do change significantly, sometimes within the span of a few years, even months." (29) as Baker puts it. When the Arab Spring started, the circulating version of events was that they were potential social revolutions, but when they fell short of these expectations or when the people's uprisings were highjacked by the army in the case of Egypt or led to a proxy war in the case of Syria, other versions of the uprisings emerged.

Public narratives are also subject to change when they cross cultural and linguistic boundaries. While the North African youth expressed their demands in Middle Eastern terms, these very demands were negotiated in Western terms when reported in the international media. The purpose was to garner support and internationalize their cause by creating empathy. For instance, while public narratives of the Arab Spring in Arabic highlighted among other themes dignity, martyrdom, and the Arab Islamic identity as iconic features, the English encoding of the public narratives of the Arab Spring advanced democratization, human rights, and freedom as salient demands of the youth. This is a

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discursive tool with political imports. It does not necessarily entail the translator's manipulation of the source, but engaging in a process of selection and omission, even when it is practiced for other reasons such as formatting or publishing requirements, such reconfiguration of the narrative still has political consequences.

There are five subsections that do not appear in the English version of the anthology that one may explain as 'unfitting' elements of the Arab Spring narrative in English (60-61). For instance, Aleya-Sghaier mentioned in the fifth subsection that opposing Israel and supporting the Palestinian cause were among the relevant slogans of the uprisings, which does not appear in the English version. Although this element seems to be marginal in the Arabic text, its existence in the English version would have serious impact on the narrative that Tunisians for instance wanted to export to the western audience.

Authoritarian regimes in North Africa have been using censorship to block any channels that could undermine their version of the Arab Spring public narratives while this very version was being challenged by dissenting public narratives. For the pro-Arab Spring narratives to escape the filters of the censorship machine, it required actors who first subscribed to them and had the necessary skills to transfer them in. Paramount among these actors were translators who made sure, for instance, to contest the western conspiracy narratives and promoted the stories that reinforced the narratives of the uprisings being social revolutions.

Public narratives are elaborated within institutions, but depend on translation for their dissemination. It is the authority of the institution and its actors that give its narratives power. Government establishment, religious authorities and academic institutions are among the most producers of public narratives. However, with the ease of sharing that

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comes with social media, one individual can contest a narrative of a prime minister, a sharia jurist or a think tank member. The individual's contribution gains power by sharing it and if it becomes viral, it will attract the attention of other institutions that give it even more power. Anonymity is usually exercised in contesting public narratives for fear of prosecution.

*Conceptual narratives*

The third type of narratives is what Somers and Gibson called conceptual narratives, confining their definition to the field of social research. Baker called this category by extension disciplinary narratives and more broadly defined it as "…the stories and explanations that scholars in any field elaborate for themselves and others about their object of inquiry." (39). Harding also called this category theoretical narratives in an attempt to escape the privileged limits of academia and "[focus] on the act of theorizing that these narratives involve, particularly with regard to their use of abstract terms to account for concrete events and situations…" (284). However, it is hard for any theoretical narrative to gain currency if its author lacks certain authority, so the 'theoretical' label is an unnecessary replacement of the 'disciplinary' label. I do find 'authoritative' a more encompassing term to label this category because authority is the main factor giving this type power and influence. The import of this type is much greater than that of the ontological narratives even in the case of it being issued by an individual such as a renowned scholar, a religious authority, or a monarch. More importantly, the label 'authoritative' signals the involvement of the subjects on the receiving end for granting the person or the institution the constructed authority in the first place.

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For a well-versed scholar on the Middle East, reading the accounts on the Arab Spring would reveal the embeddedness of its events with conceptual narratives in an implicit or explicit ways. Paramount among these theoretical narratives are Orientalism, Political Islam, and Post-colonial theories. While this is not to claim that the reliance of the Arab Spring studies on these conceptual narratives is exclusive, this theoretical embeddedness gave the elaboration of these specific versions on the Arab Spring different political imports.

Conceptual narratives underpin long-term meta-narratives and they become actual candidates for the meta-narrative status when the party responsible for its elaboration manages to sustain its authority for a sufficient time. In this sense, one may consider authority and time as factors of narrative status elevation. For instance, the power of the narrative of the Clash of Civilizations stems from the authority of its author Samuel Philips Huntington and Harvard University as an institution (Huntington 1996). One might think of the theory originating in English, perceived as a lingua franca, as another factor as well. While some conservatives still subscribe to this theory, it was subject to contestation by other authorities such as Edward Said's attempt to debunk it as a myth (Said 1996). Furthermore, contesting conceptual narratives shortens their life-span and may prevent them from crossing the boundary into the meta level. However, the relationship between the conceptual and the meta level is more complex than the perceived flat model as one may argue that the concepts of time and authority are also potentially elaborated as narratives and are subject to deconstruction and contestation. On the complexity of time as narrative, Ricoeur explained that, "… temporality consists in the deep *unity* of future, past,

and present…" (176), which makes the temporal configuration of events in any narrative an important variable in the construction of its meaning and status.

Baker argues that, "…the uptake and meaning of public and conceptual narratives are always influenced by the specificities of their production *and* reception." (43 – 44). The specificities of the Arab Spring as being unprecedented in the region and the context of the production of the anthology and its translation informed the construction of the meaning of their embedded conceptual narratives. As a matter of fact, it is the intended political import that dictates a certain framing of the conceptual narrative as I will demonstrate in the case of the chapter on Tunisia.

*Meta-narratives*

Somers and Gibson proposed a fourth type: meta-narratives. They define this category as "… the master narratives in which we are embedded as contemporary actors in history… Progress, Decadence, Industrialization, Enlightenment…" (61). Somers described them as epic dramas of our time such as "Capitalism vs. Communism, the Individual vs. Society, Barbarism/Nature vs. Civility." (605), and Baker evoked Bourdieu's 'the 'myth' of globalization", Progress and Cold War as examples (44-45). Baker, however, described 'War on Terror' as "[an] obvious potential candidate for a meta-narrative…" (45) only, which led her to raise an important question about this category of narratives, "… how a meta-narrative comes to enjoy the currency it does over considerable stretches of time and across extensive geographical boundaries." (45).  Any attempt to tackle this question should not ignore the agency of translation in ensuring the multiple manifestations of meta-narratives cross-linguistically. For a meta-narrative to stand the test of time, it should also rely on the authority of global institutions that use translation for its

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supra-national reach. One may ponder, for instance, the potential global circulation of a public narrative after its reference within the United Nations in five languages. The more weight the author of the public narrative has, the more power the public narrative gains. Its currency also increases based on, among other factors, the occasion on which it was elaborated and whether it was inscribed in a long-term international program. Since the publication of Baker's work in 2016, the War on Terror is still gaining currency internationally and it is still evoked incessantly in international affairs as a basis for military action and as a justification for controversial policies that will stay in the history records. So, one can safely say that War on Terror qualifies as a meta-narrative. In this context, where does 'the Arab Spring' fit in the narrative typology?

Answering this question would require asking more specific ones such as: does it qualify as a meta-narrative? Who invented it? Did the inventor have authority? currency and propelled its global circulation and geographical reach? How did the word choice 'Arab Spring' discursively helped its spread cross-linguistically? And, finally, what role did translation play in all of that? These questions will be explored in the meta-narrative section of the Arab Spring narratives.

*Typology revisions*

The typology of Somers and Gibson underwent revisions, but not to the extent of contesting the social functions or the import of their narrativity. For instance, Baker preferred alternative names for ontological, disciplinary and meta narratives as personal, disciplinary and master narratives respectively (Figure 2) while Harding's revision of the same typology (Figure 3) resulted in further highlighting of the distinction between two dimensions: personal narratives and shared or collective narratives claiming more

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responsibility and accountability in the former and pointing out that the types of the latter underpin the social order. Harding also substituted the names societal narratives for public narratives and theoretical narratives for disciplinary narratives arguing that the name public excluded the narratives that were not meant to be in the public domain so societal included the private one, and the name theoretical expanded this type of narratives outside the privileges of academia. A more noticeable revision in Harding's application of narrative theory in her work was the invention of the type local narratives to foreground the specificities of times, places, people and events in the elaboration of these narratives, but categorizing local narratives as collective unjustifiably characterized personal narratives as less time and space specific. Just as much as the revisions of Baker and Harding were both informed by their specific cases, the specificity of the Arab Spring narratives motivated my own revision of this typology as well.

Figure 2. Baker's Revised Typology

Figure 3. Harding's Revised Typology[2]



My revision of the typology based on the Arab Spring narratives focused on the factors that contribute to the elaboration of each type namely: slogans, authority and time. It also deals with these elements as factors of narrative status elevation to discuss for instance how a personal narrative acquires the power of a meta-narrative. Instead of opting for a flat model as in the case of Somers and Gibson or that of Baker to highlight the distinction of the types or Harding's two-dimensional model that further highlighted the

[2] Harding's revised typology reproduced as is from:
Harding, Sue-Ann Jane. ""How do I apply narrative theory?": Socio-Narrative Theory in Translation Studies." *Target International Journal of Translation Studies*, vol. 24, no. 2, 25 Feb. 2013, pp. 286–309, 10.1075/target.24.2.04har.

distinction between the personal and the shared, my model focused on a nested typology portraying the personal narratives underpinning the other categories. Since public narratives are elaborated by, within or about institutions from governments to academic establishments and even the family and society that can be considered institutions in this context and whose common denominator is authority, I preferred the label of authoritative narratives encompassing public, conceptual, and institutional narratives.

Figure 4. Typology revision based on the Arab Spring case

**The Arab Spring narratives**

*Ontological narratives*

## Tunisia

The personal story that Tunisian individual in revolt was telling himself or herself during the Arab Spring can be examined from the profile of the revolution's main protagonists sketched out by Aleya-Sghaier. In his words, "They were mostly young, unemployed, or informal workers; students; civil servants; itinerant peddlers; and marginalized and excluded individuals." (39). These beliefs and feelings of being marginalized and excluded from the society were shared collectively creating a common cause: an infringed dignity that had to be reclaimed. These personal narratives were reinforced within a collective narrative that spread through different channels mostly social media. Just like any other narrative, this collective narrative could be challenged and contested to weaken the youth movement, but due to the unconventional channels through which it spread, the Tunisian regime was unable to contain it. It is worth mentioning, however, that this narrative stayed initially at 'the dignity-restitution' level and was not further re-constructed to question the legitimacy of Ben Ali's regime.

Authoritarian regimes such as the police state of Ben Ali's Tunisia imprisons its peoples psychologically and normalize their dire living conditions in an atmosphere of oppression and fear. This state of mind paralyzing Tunisians originated in their normalized personal stories but the unfolding and the framing of the events after the self-immolation

of Bouazizi dissipated the fear and created a different type of personal narratives, the kind that called for action to reclaim an absent normal: dignity. The change in the personal stories did not occur by chance, but it was a process that mobilized external actors and engaged multi-lingual platforms such as non-Arabic newspapers, in which translation played a major role, and foreign officials of the United Nations and foreign governments who relied on translation to voice their positions regarding the Tunisian uprising. A major function of translating the Tunisian common cause was to imbue their movement with authority and having *The New York Times* for instance echo their collective narrative as exemplified in its early articles such as Robert F. Worth's *How a Single Match Can Ignite a Revolution* fulfilled that end. Collective narratives also gain currency through their reiteration by foreign officials who enjoy institutional representative authority.

## Egypt

Shahin attributed the success of the Egyptian revolution to mass mobilization highlighting traditional and modern techniques. A closer look, however, shows that ontological narratives were the fundamental elements in achieving such mobilization. It takes courage and conviction for any individual to join mass protests and this requires from each person to consistently tell himself or herself the same story that affirms these beliefs. Shahin quoted a protester's self-affirmation story that supports this claim, "From the very first day we felt we could win because of the huge numbers of people involved, the masses. When you are at a protest and you see small numbers, you panic and you are afraid. This was different." (53). This protester must not have been an exception and his or her personal story could not have withstood a competing larger narrative without an active engagement

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of mass media and protest organizers to disseminate narratives that sustained mass mobilization regardless of whether they were the facts on the ground.

This active engagement primarily targeted the ontological narratives of the protesters and facilitated their sharing to give them power. Shahin quoted another protester, "We wanted to project a positive image to the people at home, to maintain a positive spirit. If the people saw us clashing with the police they would be scared. But when we did not attack the police, we conveyed a sense of calm, and sent a message that we were not afraid.[21]" (67). This agenda dictated the approach of those in support of the Egyptian revolt in mediating the events on the ground. Whether this mediation was in writing or via other audiovisual platforms, the language used was subject to framing to fulfill it. On the other hand, those who were against the revolt, had an opposite agenda and needed to frame their language accordingly as well. In both cases, translators were among the main actors to sustain or contest the frame of this language while crossing the linguistic and geographical boundaries.

Another case in which Shahin conveyed an ontological narrative that aimed at countering the Egyptian regime's intents to frighten the revolting youth is the framing of the involvement of 'the thugs' in the uprisings in his words, "Some participants even informed me that ''good thugs'' from surrounding neighborhoods came to their rescue and helped overpower the ''bad thugs.''" (69). The story of 'these armed thugs, who reportedly used excessive violence, helping protesters' aimed at reassuring the protesters and even sowing doubt within thugs. These stories constructed and reconfigured the events on the ground and the protesters who came across those stories acted according to the stories and not necessarily based on what was happening on the ground. It is worth highlighting that

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the discursive process used in the elaboration of this story is framing by labelling in which the lexical item 'good thugs' made a big difference as explained.

## Libya

Ontological narratives have little power on the society unless they are shared and channeled through mass mobilization, but the study of the Libyan chapter shows a peculiar case. Qaddafi's ontological narrative had been steering the fate of all Libyan people for decades in the words of Sawani, "Because Qadhafi [*sic*] wanted to build a state in a way that satisfied his personal aspirations and ego as a self-acclaimed visionary or 'prophet' whose ideology or philosophy could resolve all human agonies, he took Libya on an exhaustive odyssey, claiming the application of 'direct democracy'" (82). Authority when abused makes it possible to impose one's ontological narrative on the group and in the case of Libya, an ontological narrative had been imposed on an entire nation. Qaddafi, in the words of Sawani, "…was driven towards personal glory and the building of a personality cult around himself…" (82), which turned his personal narrative into what I call an authoritarian narrative. It is still a personal narrative, but its echo is larger than the person encapsulating public narratives and appropriating even conceptual and institutional narratives. Qaddafi used the public narratives of pan-Arabism, anti-imperialism and the Cold War to impose himself as a "Third World leader" (82) and used conceptual narratives from the communist ideology to legitimize his regime. His personal narrative became a super-narrative, but it was not accepted as such, it was imposed on his people.

The authoritarian regime of Qaddafi and his repressive policies perpetuated the culture of fear in the form of self-imposed personal narratives, which were the first barrier the Libyans had to break for their uprising to gain momentum. For this purpose, there was

a need to portray 'the revolutions' of neighboring countries as successful and frame each policy taken by the regime of Qaddafi as yielding to pressure so that the youth become more confident. This process required a great deal of linguistic agency including that of translators.

The Arab Spring experience in Libya demonstrated that narrativity is an effective paradigm to disentangle gender issues whose complexities remain underexplored and undertheorized in the MENA region. Through the prism of narrative typology, investigating the politics of gender issues in MENA result in a spectrum of facets whose interpretations can be found in religion, culture and the inherited memory of the region's peoples. Sawani explained that in the Libyan political sphere, "Quite often women were unwelcome psychologically and socially" (93), which of course did not make Libya an exception among its neighbors or most of the Arab World. Aleya-Sghaier, similarly, pointed out in reference to the Tunisian revolt that, "Generally, in Muslim countries, the public sphere and political action are restricted to men." (41). This state of gender relations, when projected through the prism of narrativity, breaks up into its constituent issues.

Narratives normalize and stabilize gender relations in the form of accepted ontological stories, compatible public narratives and encapsulating authoritative (mostly religious) conceptual narratives. Eventually, the dominant meta-narrative assigns different functions to different genders, which becomes the norm. Only standing outside the meta-narrative that one is able to critically observe this 'norm'. The Arab Spring, as a master-narrative, disrupted the 'norm' and relatively facilitated the participation of women in the revolts as demonstrated in each country case. Therefore, the experience of the Arab Spring, as understood from the perspective of narrative theory can serve as a model to advance

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gender equality and women's rights in which translation can play a major role in disrupting the norms by either contesting or promoting one narrative or the other. It is worth mentioning that translators as social agents must have been implicated in the circulation of the very narratives normalizing the current gender relations in MENA and this is to rebut the myth of translation being exclusively an agency for the common good.

Narrativity is equally effective in exploring the complexities of the politics of race in MENA. Libya provided an illustrative case during the Arab Spring in which a narrative was behind discriminatory acts that can be misconstrued as a racial discrimination. Sawani pointed out that, "Though no conclusive evidence has proved the exclusive involvement of Africans, there is widespread belief amongst Libyans that they constituted the bulk of mercenary forces resorted to by the regime.[82] Given that Libya was host to more than two million African migrant workers, this led to the deterioration of their conditions during the revolution." (97). Narrative theory assumes that people's behaviors are ultimately guided by the stories they come to believe and that is despite of their veracity. As a matter of fact, ordinary people are most vulnerable to the uncritical 'consumption' of reductionist and overly-simplistic narratives, hence their great potential to cause harm among which racial discrimination. Thus, advancing major racial causes can rely on the active targeting of the narratives that motivate and construct them. A process that can arguably call upon the agency of translation.

Economic behavior of individuals in post-independent MENA countries can be understood in the form of ontological narratives as well. Sawani observes that "… the *rentier* economy arguably engendered contempt for work and effort as social values." (98) in Libya, a revelation that applies to Algeria as well, although to a much lesser extent. From

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a narrativity perspective, this contempt originates from the personal stories people tell themselves about work and effort. In other words, the economy contributes to the elaboration of certain personal stories and is shaped by specific personal stories. This insight of reciprocity raises the question of how can personal stories be changed through mediation to eventually influence the economy. For instance, initiating nationwide programs to promote work and effort as social values from children stories to different forms of art, a material that is available for translation across the borders or to dig from a nation's past.

## Morocco

Another peculiar ontological narrative can be found in the Moroccan case. The story around the status of the Moroccan king is a personal story that constructs his legitimacy to rein and rule. The king does not only tell himself that story about the world around him, but his legitimacy requires from his subjects to collectively believe in it. Darif explained that Mohamed VI inherited his 'status narrative' from his predecessor "… as the *amir al-mu'minin*, or Commander of the Faithful, an identity that has provided religious legitimization of the monarchy's rule, as expressed in Article 19 of the constitution." (106), and he added, "Like his predecessor, King Mohamed VI urged everyone in the kingdom to pledge their allegiance to him (bayaa) as king of the monarchy." (107). The specificity of this personal narrative is that it is constructed on two pillars: the status name '*amir al-mu'minin*' and the collective participation of his subjects 'bayaa'. Although both 'Commander of the Faithful' and 'oath of allegiance' as English translations convey the meaning of the Arabic terms, the English terms are stripped of the religious dimension through translation. The Arabic codification uses the Moroccan people's emotional

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investment in Islam and projects it on the King while the royal family reaffirms this legitimacy by preserving this investment. One threat to this investment and by extension the royal family's legitimacy to rule is not street protests, but the narratives that contest the religious legitimacy construct.

*Public narratives*

## Tunisia

The first public narrative that Aleya-Sghaier put forward in his chapter was in his attempt to define the Tunisian uprisings in his words,

The Tunisian revolution is also particular to Tunisia. It was not a classical revolution like the French Revolution, with a transition from a feudal to a bourgeois regime. It was not a communist class-driven revolution like the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. Nor was it a national liberation revolution like that of Vietnam or Algeria, or a revolution for human rights like the Eastern European revolutions of the 1990s. The Tunisian Revolution was unique. It was neither red nor orange nor jasmine; it was a ''revolution of dignity.'' It is special because it was spontaneous, lacking a centralized leadership, a clear ideology, and any preestablished [*sic*] political program. Nonetheless, it was not a ''blind revolution.'' It was a revolution of all the Tunisian people and the whole country. It was also the first revolution of this century that employed the Internet and television on a large scale. (30)

The emphasis on the Tunisian uprisings being a revolution here should not be taken for granted. Despite the need that Aleya-Sghaier saw to differentiate it from other revolutions in the past, the time of the writing and his active involvement in the events made his choice more political. Having expressed any caution from his part would have undermined a

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shared public narrative in Tunisia whereby the people's uprisings must have been more than just a revolt and the outcome of which would have to be that of a social revolution. Although Aleya-Sghaier did not refer in his chapter to this 'revolution of dignity' as 'a social revolution', he did not call it 'a political revolution' either. Larémont's assertion in his new introduction, written in late November of 2012 and almost three months after the translation of the other chapters, that the Tunisian uprisings were 'a political revolution' could not have served as a suitable public narrative for the Tunisians who were seeking a social change then. The question here is not which public narrative is 'accurate', but which public narrative served that purpose at that specific time.

Another public narrative which is directly linked to the personal narratives of the uprising youth in Tunisia is about "… the degree of luxury in which the privileged members of the regime lived (villas, private jets, palaces, luxury cars, private clubs, bank accounts in Tunisia and abroad) …" (32). These are stories that individuals shared across different multimedia platforms to nurture their own personal narratives of injustice and inequality of wealth distribution. The way these stories were framed mattered more than their veracity. While the frame was to a far extent under state control through censorship and institutional channeling such as the justification of inequality with other authoritative religious narratives in mosques, social media disrupted the traditional ways of communication and made it possible to escape the imposed authoritarian prison of thought control.

As much as public narratives served the development of the Arab Spring, the stagnant status of the pre-Arab Spring period rested upon other public narratives as well. Aleya-Sghaier mentioned that, "With the complicity of Western countries and under the

pretext of combating fundamentalism, Ben Ali had turned his country into a large prison."
(33). 'Combating fundamentalism' is a public narrative that has not been an exception to
Tunisia, its effect has served as the basis for the perpetuation of many authoritarian regimes
in the MENA region even human rights violations sometimes such as the Algerian Black
Decade and the current Egypt's Sissy regime. To understand the exploitation of this type
of narratives in a Western context, one may ponder a similar yet not less dangerous public
narrative that is currently gaining currency in the West with the rise of the extreme right
and populist movements that fuel islamophobia and hate crimes. It is constructed through
'the Islamization of fundamentalism' and sold as "fundamentalism promoted by Islam".

As mentioned in my typology revision about slogans being a narrative elevation
factor, they elevated the Tunisians' personal stories to the collective status and served as a
powerful cognitive channel for public narratives. In Aleya-Sghaier's description of the
demonstration in Mohammed Ali Square of January 14, 2011, he reported that, "... tens of
thousands of Tunisians, young and old, unemployed and employed, and from all social and
professional groups, including teachers, students, pupils, lawyers, merchants, employees,
and civil servants, cried in unison in front of the Ministry of the Interior: ''Step down! Step
down!''..." (34). 'Step down!' was only the first version of a common slogan that spread
across the Arab Spring countries unifying protesters public narratives across the borders.
However, this slogan did not find much of an echo within the protests in Morocco and
Algeria because both regimes managed to divert their demands into apolitical directions.

A great example of how the dynamics between shared and personal narratives guide
the behaviors of individuals and eventually mobilizes the masses is in the words of Aleya-
Sghaier reporting that, "According to the perpetrators, looting consumer goods was not

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stealing; rather, it was a way of taking the law into their own hands and regaining those things of which they had been unjustly deprived." (37). 'Taking the law into one's own hands' makes the once illicit act justifiable and mobilizes the masses by sharing it. This shows the powerful effect of a collective narrative on individual behaviors and with real-life consequences.

Aleya-Sghaier romanticized the role of the army and wrapped it in a public narrative in his words, "… [The] soldiers had fraternized with the demonstrators, exchanging hugs, flowers, and kisses. Frequently, soldiers prevented the police from attacking youths." (47). While one would argue for the positive import of sharing such a story in Tunisia, exporting it to neighboring countries would have been gifting Egyptians, Algerians or the Syrians for instance a time-bomb due to the military nature of their regimes. The brutal intervention of the Algerian army during the Black Decade or the crimes of the Syrian army attest to this claim. Public narratives are highly contextual and stripping them of their context may result in dire consequences. This context-stripping is not an unusual outcome of the agency of translation.

## Egypt

As we have seen with the Tunisian uprisings' slogans, the Egyptian revolution had its share of slogans as well. Shahin argued that second to mass mobilization, the peaceful nature of the protests in Egypt was a major factor in its success in toppling the president (54). 'The Egyptian revolution is peaceful' has been a public narrative that protesters kept alive in their chants. In this context, Shahin described this scene, "They avoided clashes with the security forces in order to not alienate potential participants and to raise sympathy

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for their cause. Their main slogan, particularly when confronting the brutal crackdowns of the security police, was ''Peaceful . . . Peaceful.''" (54).

Buzzwords and mantras play a similar role to that of slogans in both voicing and sustaining the public narratives of protest movements as we could see in the adopted names of Egyptian protests "… the National Rally for Democratic Change, Journalists for Change, Doctors for Change, Intellectuals for Change, Writers for Change, and Youth for Change." (58). Not only the transmission of public narratives in the form of slogans, buzzwords and mantras perpetuates a unified public spirit, it also works at the individual level such as "end[ing] the culture of fear that was prevalent among Egyptians." (58), the origin of which is ontological narratives that authoritarian regimes reinforce through larger narratives in order to keep their subjects paralyzed. The dynamics of slogans in protests is usually managed by framing them in some context and the religious one is the most effective among all due to the personal investment of ordinary citizens in religion, but adopting such approach could have given Mubarak's regime a pretext to crack down on the protesters with the West's blessing. It is for this reason the Muslim Brothers resisted the religious framing. The leadership of protest movements used these slogans to articulate their demands and mark a change in public narratives as Shahin observed, "The list of demands began to escalate from ''Bread, Freedom, and Social Justice'' to ''The People Want to Change the Regime,'' to ''The People Want to Try the Butcher,'' to ''The People Want to Clean up the State Institutions.'' (70).

The utility of slogans sometimes exceeds the mere transmission of public narratives: slogans may initiate them. Amid the fear of a military brutality in the case of

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Egypt, chanting "The army and the people are one hand!" (71) during protests provided a relief and a morale booster at the personal level.

Public narratives change according to the advanced agendas or cumulate into a larger narrative to be candidates for a super-narrative. In that process, several actors including international media networks with their advanced technological tools create an idealistic aura in which certain events become iconic such as the so called "Spirit of Tahrir". This shared spirit that Egyptians came to experience directly or mediated was symbolized for instance in the scene reported by Shahin, "Photos of Copts protecting Muslims during their Friday prayers and then being protected by Muslims during their own Sunday services…" (55) (Figure 5). The spread of idealistic spirits, the elaboration of iconic scenes and the construction of social symbolism around public narratives contribute to the elevation of these narratives from the public level to a larger one and may qualify them for a super-narrative even for a short period.

Figure 5: Photo 1 Photo 2

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**Libya**

A distinctive public narrative in the case of Libya is the framing of the foreign intervention, specifically the shared stories around NATO and how it impinged upon the larger story of the Libyan revolution being a youth, popular and somehow spontaneous uprising. One such framing is expressed in opposition to NATO's invasion of Iraq as Sawani put it, "the Libyan case can be distinguished from Iraq because from the standpoint of the Libyan rebels, their decision to resist the regime had the support of the Arab League and it was the League that requested Western military intervention to protect civilians and to disable the regime, which was eventually overthrown." (76), but one could raise other questions to elaborate competing stories with this standpoint such as this question: could have the Arab League stopped the invasion of Iraq? If not, then the Arab League's request for a Western intervention in Libya did not necessarily mean that the intervention was justifiable. Legitimate or otherwise, at the time of the Libyan uprisings there was a need to both legitimize NATO's intervention and keep the larger story of the uprising in Libya within the Arab Spring meta-narrative.

The Libyans needed to believe in a story similar to Tunisia's and Egypt's that a youth uprising led to the toppling of a dictator. Any other competing story could have negatively impacted the outcome of their revolt. Sawani narrated how the Libyan 'intifada' started in his words, "On 15 February 2011 when security forces arrested young lawyer Fathi Terbil and subjected him to interrogation, a spontaneous gathering of people from all walks of life took place in front of the security headquarters in Benghazi. Among those who participated were human rights activists, lawyers, judges, academics, journalists, doctors, educated citizens, and students." (76). The parallels between this story and what

Aleya-Sghaier narrated about the Tunisian uprising trigger are hard to ignore: the self-immolation of Bouazizi with the arrest of Fathi Terbil and the spontaneous eruption of protests in both scenarios. Despite of how representative this story was to the facts on the ground or the other possible ways it could be told, "[it] spread swiftly throughout the country when a Libyan journalist (Idris Al-Mesmari) broke the story in a telephone conversation with the *Aljazeera* [sic] news channel." (76) and created the desired collective narrative that "[p]eople sensed that the regime was in a state of fear…" (76) as Sawani explained.

Another public narrative that helped prepare for NATO's intervention in Libya centered around the probability of Qaddafi "…[carrying] a war of extermination in Benghazi." (79), and as Sawani put it, "[there] was a realization that if his forces remained unchecked, they would quite possibly commit a barbaric massacre of the sort that transpired in Srebrenica. Mass slaughter in Benghazi seemed a likely and horrific reality." (79). Such narrative would create empathy with the Libyan people in the West by reviving the scenarios of past crimes against humanity so that NATO decision makers would face less resistance to intervene especially after its misadventure in Iraq. For this public narrative to circulate in the West, it needed translation and framing and most likely by entities in favor of the intervention. There was also a need to prepare the Libyan people for the intervention and this public narrative must have convinced the Libyans that NATO was their salvation. Framing this public narrative in Sawani's terms as the result of "[the] coordinated efforts of Western, Arab, and Muslim leaders…" (79) was a politically motivated linguistic act in this sense.

**Morocco**

Darif claimed that, "The Arab Spring that began in Tunisia and Egypt during December 2010 and January 2011 spurred the creation of the February 20th, 2011 Movement in Morocco that demanded the acceleration of real political and constitutional change." (110), but February 20th, 2011 Movement did not call for the dethroning of the king, which was among the demands and celebrated outcome of street protests in Tunisia and Egypt. The Moroccan regime managed to hinder the demands from escalating to the point of questioning the legitimacy of the king by constraining the movement demands with public narratives, for instance, allowing and steering "…the formation of virtual groups of political contestation on Facebook and other social media, especially the group called "Moroccans Dialoguing with the King." (110). Tunisians did not revolt to dialogue with Ben Ali nor did the Egyptians and the Libyans to sit and talk with their respective sovereigns. Labelling the Moroccan movement as "Moroccans Dialoging with the King" limited its political reach and served both as a tool to absorb the heat from neighboring countries and divert the social unease in a non-threatening direction to the legitimacy of the king to rule. This is a linguistic act before any other considerations and failing to notice these dynamics would both limit our understanding of the development of the Arab Spring and overshadow the possibilities that were available to intervene through linguistic means.

North African youth revolted primarily against authoritarianism that deprived them of their dignity and the only kingdom in North Africa was not less authoritarian. Darif explains that, "[the] 1972 Constitution derived its notions of legitimization from tradition and religion. It charged the notion of legitimacy with traditional and religious expressions, such as redefining democracy as *shura* (counsel) and the parliament as a *majlis al-shura*

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(Advisory Council). This constitution, with its merger of notions of "civic" and "religious legitimacy" realistically led to the creation of a monarchy that leaned towards authoritarianism rather than the creation of a constitutionally constrained monarchy." (118), so the 'abuse of' power of the monarch has been the essence of the Moroccan claimed authoritarianism and questioning his constructed religious legitimacy could have been among the issues raised by the February 20th, 2011 Movement, but it was not the case. Diverting any political action form this issue is central to the perpetuation of the Monarchy, which also holds true for the Algerian regime's ceaseless protection of the 'sacredness' of its revolutionary legitimacy. However, the discursive deconstruction of these legitimacies is a linguistic act that has far reaching political consequences especially contesting the abuse of these legitimacies. Furthermore, both regimes would have less control over other media in which this discursive deconstruction may take place than the political platform. A political party may be banned or dissolved, but regimes are unable to control every narrative that can manifest in different forms textual, audio-visual and otherwise. In this sense, translation is an effective tool for the circulation and mediation of the manifestation of these narratives, hence its potential for dissent and political change.

**Algeria**

Layachi explained in his chapter that the Algerian regime managed to circumvent the Arab Spring "… by pointing to the chaos and uncertainties in post-Qaddhafi Libya, post-Mubarak Egypt and post-Saleh Yemen." (125). This was a public narrative elaborated by the state to dissuade the people from revolting and instill fear in them. The elaboration and dissemination of this narrative is a linguistic act that required authority and mediation. Authority ensured its circulation because when, for instance, a Prime Minister makes a

statement which is embedded with a story to counter the Arab Spring meta-narrative, state-controlled media tend to circulate it much wider than the case when the same story is elaborated by an entity with less authority. Layachi mentioned that, "Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia explicitly expressed his dismay at the "Arab Spring" which he presented as a foreign conspiracy against the Arab states." (141), which highlights another counter-narrative namely the common known label to the Algerian regime: 'the foreign hand', but with the same purpose of undermining the meta-narrative of the Arab Spring. Mediating these stories on the other hand ensured the circulation of these stories across the linguistic boundaries. For these narratives to have the same political import, the agent makes the important decision of subscribing to the same agenda (countering the Arab Spring narrative) and defend the frame of the story intra-lingually or reproduce it cross-linguistically.

Journalists, reporters, translators and other mediators are already involved in some kind of agenda by signing up for the work or working for an institution with clear political ideology, but they still make a decision when they are faced with a certain narrative to mediate. These mediators can be more visible when they choose to change the frame of a story or even contest it. Therefore, controlling 'the who says what in what language' in Algeria has been a political tool since its independence in 1962. This tool has been primarily used to sustain the legitimacy of the historical party of the FLN to rule the country and was employed during the Arab Spring for a similar purpose.

The linguistic landscape in Algeria is intrinsically ideological which makes it prone to political exploitation, so the post-independence Algerian regime chose to exclusively politicize it to serve its own interests and avoid further politicization from other parties.

This insight is very important to understand the power relations between Arabic, French and Berber in Algeria. Paradoxically, French is not recognized as an official language in Algeria, but its official use has not ceased since the independence. Recognizing French as an official language has meant, according to the regime's narrative, granting France what it could not achieve for over 132 years during the colonial period, so that is a purely political decision. Arabic has been the 'declared' state's official language since the independence to linguistically indicate Algeria's reintegration of the Arab World and the minority language Tamazight was recognized as a second official language after a long fight on February 7th, 2016. The relevant matter, however, is that French is used by the intelligentsia in Algeria; therefore, the Algerian regime tightens its grip on the circulation of legitimacy-threating narratives more in Arabic than in French exploiting the communicative gap between the elitist French and the populist Arabic.

Layachi raised an important question regarding the framing of the uprisings in MENA as the 'Arab Spring' in his words, "Very few people have taken a moment to define "Arab Spring" beyond simply meaning 'popular revolt against authoritarian rulers.'… even though the phenomenon to which it refers has been misconstrued by many observers. Also, the word "Arab" in the expression implicitly excludes those who have rebelled but do not share the Arab identity, such as some Berbers of North Africa." (126). So, the framing of the Arab Spring as such helped its circulation across 'the Arab World', but highlighting its incongruity both demonstrates that the framing was political and serves as a tool to deconstruct and contest it as a master-narrative.

One of the effects of public narratives is to normalize a what might be considered otherwise an exception. Layachi commented about the social landscape in Algeria that

"Riots have in fact become such a regular occurrence that not a single day passes without more than one riot occurring somewhere in the country. Nowadays, whenever they face a problem which neither the local authorities nor the state addresses—and promptly— people often take to the street and attack government buildings, block traffic on main roads and organize sittings and even hunger strikes." (136). The common occurrence of these forms of anger expression and their daily reporting made their stories embedded in the larger public narratives that individuals consume with a growing conviction in their ineffectiveness. This might also have contributed to the non-responsiveness of Algerians when they saw the protests leading to the toppling of the dictators in neighboring Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. However, just as narratives have the potential of normalizing exceptions rendering them ineffective, they also have the potential of framing the ordinary as extraordinary for political purposes.

Among the other reasons that, Layachi says, are often cited to "explain the inability of the political opposition to mount and sustain mass demonstrations against the political, economic and social conditions…is that the traumatic 1990s decade is still fresh in people's memory and its wounds have not yet healed." (138). This highlights an important aspect of narrativity as it relates to trauma and memory. Traumatic effects can be recreated through narrativity beyond the timeframe of the traumatic event and it is often performed for political reasons. Unless there is an active agency to heal the people's 'believed' trauma, authoritarian actors can keep passing along wounds to generations who did not live the pain. This sort of manipulation is very dangerous as it paralyzes the people or even worse desensitizes them as they see a similar pain inflicted on others. World history has plenty of

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examples of these manipulations and the political use of the Holocaust narratives is a fine case in point.

Public narratives are in fact co-authored and individuals have the choice to subscribe to them even though they emanate primarily form institutions with authority. People on the receiving end also contribute to the construction of the meaning of the originating public narratives and thus decide of its outcome. While the self-immolation of Bouazizi is considered the trigger of 'a revolution' in Tunisia, the ensuing similar cases that took place in Algeria in emulation of his act did not have the same echo. The Algerian youth did not perceive the self-immolation of individuals as a heroic act because the Black Decade taught them that the Algerian authorities would not respond positively to desperate acts. As a matter of fact, the abuse of the revolutionary legitimacy by the regime made the new generation in Algeria cynical about the very issue of national sacrifice and martyrdom. This explanation does not lie outside narrativity, it is the narrative position of the Algerian people that made them construct a different meaning for the incidents of self-immolation. *Conceptual Narratives*

**The Introduction**

In the new introduction of the anthology, Larémont drew on Theda Skocpol's conceptual narrative distinguishing social revolutions from political revolutions to revisit the MENA uprisings (2-3). Although this conceptual narrative was available at the heat of the uprisings, none of the anthology contributors saw a political motive to question whether the 'revolutions' were less social or more political. Forecasting a distinction of the uprisings early on as revolts, coup d'états and mass demonstrations could have undermined the willingness of the youth to seek more change. Furthermore, the intervention of the army

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in Egypt must not have come with much surprise to scholars on the Middle East due to the nature of the Egyptian regime. Shahin, however, did emphasize in his chapter that the 'revolt' was a revolution and portrayed an overly positive role of the army in it. This dissimilarity demonstrates that the meaning and the frame of conceptual narratives are time-and-context sensitive and may be politically instrumentalized, hence the potential of translation agency in this process.

## Tunisia

The intertextuality of conceptual narratives is not always explicit as in the case of framing some theory to be read in a specific context. Aleya-Sghaier described Bouazizi's incident as, "One official slapped Bouazizi which affronted his dignity and resulted in his desperate cry for justice." (31); whereas Larémont reported in the introduction that "… [Bouazizi was] allegedly slapped in the face by the city inspector, who was a woman." (1). Aleya-Sghaier reference to dignity in his description served the elaboration of 'the revolution of dignity' as a public narrative, but Larémont choice to add 'who was a woman' evokes a conceptual narrative of how men in the East is perceived in the West. Maybe Larémont had in his mind an English audience, but certainly the mentioning of the city inspector being a woman evokes conceptual stories whose origin is in the orientalist literature. This observation is evidenced in the decision of the Arabic co-editor Sawani to add "... بصفته رجلاً شرقياً..."""… being a man from the East…" (7).

Aleya-Sghaier explicitly used two conceptual narratives to frame his claims and defend his political views. First, by citing Frederick Engels' *Theory of Violence* with the quotation "violence is the midwife of history." (36), and Frantz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* that "[Fanon] argues…that the oppressed are liberated by the exercise of

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violence, and the infliction of pain on their oppressors is a step on the path toward healing the suffering of their bodies and souls." (38). Citing Engels served as a conceptual narrative to highlight the peaceful nature and exceptionalism of the Tunisian resistance whereas citing Fanon served as a conceptual narrative to mitigate the reported violence of the masses. The effectiveness of both theoretical narratives in achieving these ends rested upon the authority of Engels and Fanon as much as the quotations themselves.

## Algeria

The Algerian regime legitimized its economic model during the first two decades after the independence based on the narrative that 'capitalism is associated with inequality, injustice, and colonialism'. While this elaboration is based on a conceptual narrative that has currency within socialist countries, post-independence Algeria's choice to opt for socialism did not necessarily create an economic model in opposition to this elaboration since it was not conducive for social equality, justice and human dignity. Au contraire, the failed socialist model led to the precarious state of hydrocarbon-revenue dependency, inequality of wealth distribution and individuals stifled by bureaucratic inertia. The relevant matter here is how this conceptual narrative worked. Freshly independent, Algerians were craving more freedom, justice and dignity, so that shaped their ontological narratives that were embedded in the public narratives of the FLN and in the ideological trends of that time such as the Cold War and the Non-Aligned Movement, which served as temporary super-narratives encompassing the other conceptual, public and ontological narratives like a matryoshka doll.

*Meta-narratives*

Aleya-Sghaier claimed that Tunisians "never thought of exporting their revolution…" (49), but the unexpected uprisings and their ensuing ousting of the Tunisian authoritarian ruler Ben Ali caught the world with surprise, which made its global circulation as a narrative inevitable. Western governments initially shaped the official version of the uprisings in a fashion that did not question the nature of the Tunisian uprisings as being 'a revolution' nor did they rule out the possibility of a domino effect in the neighboring countries. When similar uprisings erupted in Egypt and Libya the specter of a larger phenomenon started haunting the whole MENA region, which elevated the narrative on the Tunisian uprising to a larger level to acquire the super-narrative characteristics. However, its version as an 'Arab Spring' meaning 'peaceful revolutions leading to the dethroning of authoritarian rulers to usher a democratic era in the region' had to stand the test of time to qualify as a true meta-narrative, but this version was short-lived after the military intervention in Egypt, the ensuing internal war in Libya and the proxy war in Syria. Other versions emerged taking different labels such as the Arab Awakening to signal a different take on the events or a more sophisticated version that dismantled the Arab Spring narrative into demonstrations, revolts, and coup d'états as we have seen in the academic analysis of Larémont. One can also infer from the difference of the anthology's English and Arabic titles that the Arab Spring as a label has more currency in Arabic than English. It would be safe to say that the Tunisian revolt was exported in 'a social revolution' narrative package, shipped internationally and received as a salvation gift in the countries to follow only to reveal its surprises in the series of the North African uprisings.

In a *Foreign Policy* article entitled *Who first used the term Arab Spring?* published on November 04, 2011, Joshua Keating, an associate editor, attempted to trace the earliest use of the term Arab Spring.[3] While he was cautious about whether *Foreign Policy* was first to coin it, he claimed that, "the term "Arab Spring" was originally used, primarily by U.S. conservative commentators, to refer to a short-lived flowering of Middle Eastern democracy movements in 2005." In reference to the conservative commentators, Keating hyperlinked his article to a column by Charles Krauthammer published on March 21, 2005 in *The Seattle Times* in which the author virulently criticized the left and argued that, "The Arab Spring of 2005 will be noted by history as a similar turning point [as Europe of 1989 or Europe of 1884] for the Arab world.".[4] This was all in defense of the United States' intervention in Iraq and in celebration of the 2005 protests in Beirut. So, the term 'Arab Spring' did exist for at least five years before the December 2010 trigger of 'The Arab Spring', but Keating claimed that its use was resuscitated by FP's Marc Lynch in a post entitled *Obama's Arab Spring* published on January 06, 2011 "only two days after the death of Tunisian fruit-vendor Mohamed Bouazizi". Keating also mentioned a subsequent use without reference to the 2005 events of the term on January 14, 2011 in an editorial of *The Christian Science Monitor*. The date of the next mentioned reference was January 25, 2011 by the then Egypt's opposition leader ElBaradei in *Der Spiegel* who drew parallels between the Arab Spring and the 1968 so-called Prague Spring. Yet, Keating explained that "…many Arab intellectuals and activists have always been somewhat uncomfortable with the term. This should not be surprising since it refers back to the "Prague Spring," a

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[3] Keating, Joshua. "Who First Used the Term Arab Spring?" *Foreign Policy*, 4 Nov. 2011, foreignpolicy.com/2011/11/04/who-first-used-the-term-arab-spring/. Accessed 26 Mar. 2017.
[4] Staff, Seattle Times. "The Arab Spring of 2005." *The Seattle Times*, The Seattle Times Company, 20 Mar. 2005, www.seattletimes.com/opinion/the-arab-spring-of-2005/. Accessed 26 Mar. 2017.

brief moment of democratic freedom that was eventually crushed by Soviet tanks." Therefore, this label has a political import and the narrative it branded has been subject to the author's agenda.

By March 2011 and after almost two months from the overthrowing of Tunisia's Ben Ali and Egypt's Mubarak, the term 'Arab Spring' became the word used in the media. This was largely because the term has been gaining currency from the authority of the institutions that have been circulating it: *Foreign Policy*, *The Times*, *Le Monde*, *Al-Jazeera* to name a few. These institutions, through the agency of translation, facilitated its multilingual global reach and elevated the narrative that the 'Arab Spring' term has been branding into a meta-narrative. Once the narrative was established as such, it started serving as an umbrella incorporating the public narratives reported from MENA.

The very word choice 'Spring' in the term 'Arab Spring' has been a major discursive factor in its development into a meta-narrative and its viral dissemination. 'Spring' metaphorically juxtaposes a harsh authoritarian winter with an Arab democratic blossom. As a matter of fact, 'Spring' in Arabic has more rhetorical currency than in English due to the poetic nature of Arabic. Furthermore, while 'Arab' has a political charge as it signals a certain language-and-identity based nationalism, 'Spring' is apolitical in this sense. The abstract nature of the term 'Spring' also helped its spread more than, for instances, revolution, revolt, protest that could limit the prospects of the uprising. The discursive work of 'Spring' here is no different from that of the word choice 'Terror' in 'War on Terror' that does not limit the war on certain incidents of terrorism as Baker explained (45). Neither 'Arab' nor 'Spring' are unproblematic, 'Arab' unjustly homogenizes the ethnically and linguistically diverse MENA, and 'Spring' inter-

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textualizes previous events such as the 'Polish Spring' of both 1956 and 1982, the 'Seoul Spring' of 1979 in Korea, and the 'Prague Spring' of 1968, whose outcome was not all sunshine and rainbows. To avoid this linguistic determinism, some intellectuals such as Tariq Ramadan in his book *The Arab Awakening* chose 'Awakening' as a more a distinctive, cautious and suspenseful term than 'Spring' (Ramadan 2012).

**Final Words**

The uprisings of the MENA peoples may have disappointed many enthused observers for not changing the authoritarian regimes, but the story that the world chose to tell about their 'revolutions' did surpass the status of a mere public narrative. Certainly, the events were short-lived, but the suspense and anticipation they created in a short period engaged the whole world. This engagement that has been to a far extent linguistic by subscribing to the narrative of 'a social revolution', justified or otherwise, has been sustaining a political agenda. The Arab Spring as a super-narrative provided a psychological frame in which sporadic personal stories about a more hopeful MENA future fused into a torrent and shook the stagnation of the region. While one may easily argue that the spring is over, it is a much harder task to argue that it will never come back. If the discursive issues and the linguistic dynamics through the agency of translation have been an integral part of the uprisings, it is because any social act is conceived and perceived in the form of a narrative. This inescapable mode of engaging with social-reality unveiled a crucial role of translation that had been naively limited to the exclusive and overly romanticized function of peace making and bridge building. As we have seen, translation may well be the perfect tool of conflict provoking and gap widening. The Arab Spring experience demonstrated how the linguistic dynamics of translation served as a landscape to foment and fan dissent and how authoritarian regimes made use of the same platform to sustain themselves. Should there be another 'Spring' season in the region or should the MENA authoritarian winter last longer, it will not happen without the agency of translation.

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# CHAPTER II

## COMPARATIVE DISCUSSION OF THE CHAPTER ON ALGERIA

## Introduction

In "*Untenable Exceptionalism During the Spring of Upheavals,*" Azzeddine Layachi argues that Algeria has already witnessed its 'Arab Spring,' referring to the riots of 1988, the subsequent rebellion and the unprecedented violence following the 1992 'military intervention.' This chapter analyzes how the regime enabled Algeria to ride the waves of the uprisings as well. It reached back to the early years of independent Algeria, discussing the failing attempts to build an institutionalized democratic State and how the State's overdependence on the hydrocarbon rents has been threatening its fragile future, hence its 'untenable exceptionalism' in Layachi's terms. His writing reveals an intimate knowledge of the Algerian vernacular and his elaborate explanations of the two Algerian sociological phenomena *hogra* and *harga* attest to that. Furthermore, Layachi's intimate knowledge of Algerian politics, his high command of English, French and Arabic made his chapter so intertextual that only a translator at his level of understanding complexity would do justice in translating his chapter.

This is the chapter I most identified with in my translation. I lived in Algeria during *the décennie noire* and I am a young person who has been sharing most of the concerns that the youth in the MENA region tried to voice through their revolts. I did not only translate, I re-expressed Layachi's point of view back in its domestic linguistic environment. My translation process entailed taking many decisions as to how the reader of the Arabic text would perceive the narrative and how his/ her perception compares to

that of the English text reader. I made sure that my Arabic text did justice to all the ideas that Layachi exposed in his English text including the specific context of the youth's struggle to live a dignified life and have a hopeful future—Ideas that were not mere stories to me, but a lived reality. I attempt to go through the salient decisions I took to produce the translation of this chapter.

*Note on style*

In addition to formatting this writing in the MLA style, I felt the need to invent a code to facilitate the task of referencing the English examples in the source and their translations in Arabic. I mention the number of the paragraph following the letter 'P' in uppercase and the number of the page of the English text following the letter 'p' in lower case and the number of the page of the Arabic translated text following the letter 's' in lower case. I picked the letter 's' from the transliterated word of the Arabic word for page that is 'saf'ha'. Example: (P9 – p 127 – s 159).

**Translation Techniques**

I translated the adjective 'authoritarian' in 'authoritarian regime' with the adjectives: شمولي ,استبدادي, and سلطوي interchangeably. I, however, believe that the adjective استبدادي is more dynamic as both شمولي and سلطوي are literal translations in the sense that سلطوي comes from سلطة, which is 'authority' the same way 'authoritarian' comes from 'authority'; and شمولي comes from the verb شمل that has the meaning of 'total', which makes it more an equivalent of 'totalitarian' than 'authoritarian'. استبدادي, on the other hand, is derived from the verb استبدَّ that means 'monopolizing opinion and right'. الاستبداد refers to a pure and anchored concept in Arabic. It appeared in the seminal book طبائع الاستبداد ومصارع الاستعباد translated sometimes as *The Characteristics of Despotism* of the Arab thinker *Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi.* The translation of الاستبداد into English appears in the context of the book of *al-kawakibi* as 'despotism', which is synonymous in this context of 'authoritarianism' (P1 – p 125 – s 157).

A helpful technique in translating English into Arabic is to consider the noun as 'the master' while the other grammatical categories including the verb as 'slaves'. I personally have always taught this translation technique to students in workshops. My translation of the book has plenty of examples that demonstrate it. For instance, 'riots engulfed key Algerian cities'. The plural noun 'riots' in English is conveyed with أعمال الشغب that poses no problem in its value as a signifier. I rendered the verb 'engulfed' with the verb اجتاحت that literally means 'invaded'. This is a slightly different metaphor than

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engulfed, but sounds perfectly Arabic to say literally 'riots invaded cities' (P2 – p 125 – s 158).

Taking the noun as 'a master' in translation saves the translator from creating awkward expressions and makes it possible to come up with eloquent constructs. For instance, a beginner may translate the phrase 'a heavy cost' as تكاليف ثقيلة, which renders the adjective heavy in the context of 'a heavy object as opposed to a lightweight one'. I could express تكاليف فادحة in translation even by ignoring the adjective 'heavy' and finding a suitable adjective in Arabic in this case فادحة that literally means 'exorbitant' (P3 – p 125 – s 158).

My Arabic translation of '… background is established…' reads as رسم هذه الخلفية, which literally means 'draw a background'. While both 'establish' and 'draw' work with 'background' in English, the literal translation of 'establish' into Arabic does not create a fluent expression. Assuredly, for a professional translator, this verb change occurs intuitively, but for an amateur this oversight is common, notably in the work of a person whose Arabic is not their native language (P11 – p 127 – ss 159- 160).

Trainee conference interpreters practice the technique of taking the noun as 'a master' in the form of reading out loud texts with blackened adjectives and/or verbs. The trainees try to come up with the appropriate adjectives or verbs while reading so that the audience listens to a complete and meaningful text. This eventually creates reflexes that come in handy during their professional work later.

I translated the key word 'revolt' with the word تمرّد that also means 'rebellion' to clearly differentiate it from the word 'revolution'. I made this decision based on the key

argument of the whole book that is that the events that took place in the MENA regions were not social revolutions (P2 – p 125 – s 158).

The English text has the word '*malaise*' in italics, which I understood that the author meant to emphasize the foreignness of the word despite of its current common use in English. I saw no need to keep the foreignness of the French word 'malaise' in the Arabic version. The translation الشعور بالضيق that literally means 'the feeling of unease' was sufficient to convey the meaning. I made my decision departing from the belief that the 'investment' of the English speaker while reading the French word in the English text is irrelevant when it comes to the reader of Arabic. I consider this an intended translation loss, but a translation loss that is, in my opinion, to no effect (P4 – p 125 – s 158).

I translated the expression 'a *malaise* that plagues the country' with the expression ابتليت به البلاد, which added two extra layers of signification. The first one is changing the grammatical order of the sentence, the subject in English is 'malaise' while the Arabic sentence is an unknown subject causing 'the malaise'. The second layer is related to the first one and it consists of the verb ابتليت from the 'infinitive or المصدر 'البلاء, which has a religious connotation that means 'trial' as in the context of 'the Lord trying His mankind'. The Arabic expression acquired this religious connotation accidentally due to my decision as a translator to use a higher register in the target text (P4 – p 125 – s 158).

I kept the translation of the metaphor 'to sail through the regional winds of change without serious reform' the same in Arabic ستحاول الابحار مع الرياح الاقليمية. Besides preserving the stylistic effect, which I could have performed through finding an equivalent metaphor or inventing a new one in Arabic, this very metaphor works perfectly in Arabic because it conveys the author's uncertainty about whether Algeria would keep its exceptionalism

while the events were still unfolding. This is a case in which the invention or the finding of an equivalent metaphor would be unnecessary and beginners lacking linguistic skills might still succeed a literal rendering (P5 – pp 125 – 126 – s 158).

I tend to differentiate in translation between 'political order' and 'political system' with the use of نظام for order and منظومة for system. Having received training in diplomatic translation, both 'political order' and 'political system' appear in Arabic as نظام سياسي in official documents that is the use of the word نظام for both 'order' and 'system'. The reader of my translation find both expressions interchangeable to the extent of no clear distinction is emphasized in the source by the source author (P9 – p 127 – s 159).

It may be useful to note that in conference interpretation highlighting the difference matters less because the communicative function of interpretation takes precedence.

The same thing applies to the translation of the verbs 'implement…' and 'execute…' in the same context. I use both جسَّدته and نفَّذته interchangeably unless the source author intentionally differentiated them in the source. In official translations, such as UN Resolutions and in this context, translators reserve جسَّدته for 'implement…' and allocate نفَّذته for 'execute…' (P9 – p 127 – s 159).

instead of ما شابه محاولة التحرر الاقتصادي I chose to translate 'Quasi-liberalization' as تحرر اقتصادي جزئي that would still convey the meaning of an 'incomplete' liberalization. The issue consists in expressing 'quasi' in Arabic (resembling or partial). I consider تحرر اقتصادي ظاهري another working translation as well since ظاهري conveys the meaning of liberalization being superficial (P9 – p 127 – s 159).

I translated 'the big bang political liberalization' as الانفجار الكبير في التحرر السياسي. It is obvious that the author here is using the image of the Big Bang Theory, which is known in Arabic as نظرية الانفجار العظيم. There is no semantic difference between the adjectives عظيم and كبير literally 'big' and 'great', but the theory in Arabic is known literally as 'the Great Bang Theory'. Translating 'the Big Bang' here as الانفجار الكبير entails a translation loss as far as the reference to the theory is concerned, but I considered this reference irrelevant due to the genre of the text. (P10 – p 127 – s 160)

I translated 'a democratization process' as عملية التحول الديموقراطي whose back-translation reads 'a process of democratic transformation'. Another good translation would be بناء الديموقراطية that literally means 'democracy building'. One notices here that I expressed 'democratization' in Arabic with two words even though Arabic has a strong derivative system. Some choose to express it sometimes as دمقرطة, but this form is an invention and it appears more in modern journalese than official documents (P19 – p 129 – ss 162 – 163).

I chose to translate 'top-down command' into Arabic as سياسة التسلّط الحكومي, which conveys the meaning of authoritarianism with the word التسلّط and evokes 'government' with the word حكومي. Another translation would be الحكم الموجه من القمة الى القاعدة, which is just more literal and it still works (P19 – p 129 – ss 162 – 163).

I chose to translate 'process' in 'democracy is… a process' as عملية and not سيرورة just because عملية qualifies more frequently 'democracy' than سيرورة that occurs more frequently with 'development'. So, 'democratic process' is عملية ديموقراطية and 'development process' is سيرورة ديموقراطية. Both سيرورة and عملية mean a series of actions (P20 – p 129 – s 163).

I translated 'bargaining-produced public policies' as توليد السياسات العامة عن طريق المفاوضة. المفاوضة is used in the singular here to differentiate it from 'negotiations' that is usually translated in Arabic as المفاوضات (the plural form of المفاوضة). One should note here that the word المساومة is even a more common translation of 'bargaining' to avoid the required singular/ plural differentiation (P20 – p 129 – s 163).

I translated 'freedom of association' as حريّة تكوين الجمعيات, which reads in Arabic 'the freedom to establish associations'. An inaccurate translation could have been حرية التجمع that renders 'association' as 'gathering'. (P21 – p 129 – s 163)

I made sure to differentiate the following terms in translation: political opening, democratization, democracy and regime change. I translated them respectively as انفتاح سياسي وبناء الديموقراطية والديموقراطية وتغيير النظام (P21 – p 129 – s 163).

I translated "Civic associations… became a vibrant part of Algerian political life" as وأصبحت تنبض بالحياة السياسية في الجزائر. I conveyed 'A vibrant part' with the metaphor of 'a heart beating' in Arabic, hence the verb تنبض. This is a stylistic translation addition that I consider my voice (P22 – p 130 – ss 163 – 164).

I translated "these organizations became a permanent fixture in Algeria's political environment…" as أحد رموز البيئة السياسية في الجزائر. I expressed 'fixture' in Arabic as 'symbols' رموز, but the meaning is kept intact in the target language (P22 – p 130 – ss 163 – 164).

The possessive 's' in the expression "the country's political dynamics" is translated as ديناميات البلاد السياسية and even if the English expression appeared with the particle 'of' as in "the political dynamics of the country", the Arabic translation will still have the same

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structure because a literal translation of the latter as الديناميات السياسية للبلاد would result in a less eloquent Arabic expression or what is termed as a *calque* that is a structural borrowing from the source which is considered as foreign in the target Arabic (P22 – p 130 – ss 163 – 164).

The Algerian context of radical Islamist groups being reported in Algerian and French outlets made them known in the international arena with their French abbreviations such as GIA, MIA, AIS and the GSPC, which is the reason the source author deemed pointless to create an English equivalent of the acronym. The translation into Arabic kept the French acronym, but matched the full wording in Arabic for instance الجماعة السلفية للدعوة والقتال for the GSPC. The frequent use of the French acronym GIA made it even possible to report this group in a transliterated form of the French acronym as الجيا (P25 – pp. 130-131 – s 165). A timely example of this usage is DAECH that is a transliteration of the Arabic acronym داعش.

My translation of 'Physical eradication of armed Islamist rebellion...' into Arabic does not render the adjective 'physical' and expresses it as القضاء that reads 'elimination', but it still does justice to the meaning in Arabic. Another successful translation would be التصفية الجسدية, which in this case requires a translation of the adjective 'physical' (P28 – pp 131 – 132 – s 167).

My translation has taken into consideration the official Arabic denomination of the political programs that the author mentioned such as the amnesty program known as 'Civil Concord', which I translated as الوئام المدني -- the official Arabic denomination (P30 – p 132 – s 168).

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I removed the double negation from the English '… insecurity and political instability began to diminish…' that I translated into Arabic as بدأ الاستقرار السياسي والأمن بالرواج, which literally reads, '…security and political stability began spreading…' My purpose was to change the emphasis in Arabic without affecting the meaning. It is just another instance where I express a preference of a certain style over another. (P32 – p 132 – s 168)

I translated 'Quite reluctantly' into Arabic as وعلى مضض instead of بتردد for instance, which raises the linguistic register to a higher rhetorical level while keeping the same meaning. Again, a stylistic choice (P36 – pp 133 -134 – ss 169 – 170).

I translated 'they had little faith in…' as لم تكن لهم ثقة تذكر, which reads in Arabic 'they had no faith in…'. Expressing 'little' literally in Arabic would sound to the Arabic reader as 'they had faith even when it is little.' (P46 – p 136 – s 174).

I chose to express 'one' in '…one wonders…' into Arabic with the word المرء so that it reads يتساءل المرء, which expresses a passive voice that mentions an 'unknown' actor to mirror the English structure without a *calque* (P59 – p 140 – s 179).

I translated 'The State's policy of putting out fires, one at a time.' into Arabic as سياسة الدولة في إخماد النار الواحدة تلو الأخرى, which conveys the exact meaning of the English, but the Arabic editor chose to add between brackets (دور الإطفائي) (the role of the firefighter), which I appreciated after reading the Arabic edited version (P74 – p 144 – s 185).

**Common Mistakes**

English does not have a dual form, hence the common mistake in translation from English into Arabic of expressing the dual that appears in the plural form in English. For instance, I translated '… immediate political and economic change.' as التغيير السياسي والاقتصادي الفوريين. The adjective فوريين is in the dual form while 'immediate' in English qualifies political change and economic change (P1 – p 125 – s 157).

In the English construct 'With these and other measures', both 'these' and 'other' precede the qualified noun 'measures', but in Arabic we find هذه preceding the noun and غير follows the noun while غير takes the ها to refer to the noun. This Arabic construct is the correct grammatical form while the translation مثل هذه التدابير وتدابير أخرى that mirrors the English structure is a common mistake (P1 – p 125 – s 157).

It should also be noted that مُهمة is the right translation of the adjective 'important' and not هامة, which is a common mistake. So, we say تغييرات سياسية مُهمة and not تغييرات سياسية هامة (P3 – p 125 – s 158).

It is a common mistake to translate 'systemic' into Arabic with منهجي, which is the translation of systematic. The accurate translation of systemic is عام or عامة, which conveys in our context the meaning of 'the whole not just particular parts' (P12 – p 127 – 128 – s 160).

'Liberalization' in 'Political liberalization' is not 'liberation'. Thus, I translated 'political liberalization' as التحرر السياسي while liberation is usually translated as التحرير. Both تحرير and تحرر have the same grammatical root in Arabic, but the differentiation in the form is meant to differentiate the meaning as well (P19 – p 129 – ss 162 – 163).

I used the accurate, yet less common, translation of 'privatization' in Arabic as خصخصة instead of the very common mistake of خوصصة (P36 – pp 133 – 134 – ss 169 – 170).

I avoided the common mistake of translating 'professional associations' as جمعيات مهَنية with a 'fat-ha' (a short vowel) on the consonant 'ha'. The right grammatical form is مهْنية with the short vowel 'sukoon'. The rule says that النسبة (forming adjectives of relation or pertinence) uses the singular form and not the plural (P38 – p 134 – ss 170 – 171).

An exception to this rule is: المواضيعية and الموضوعية in which both the singular and the plural are used in forming النسبة. This exception is meant to differentiate between 'objective' and 'thematic' that use the same root موضوع.

Similarly, I translated 'basic' in 'basic food staples' as رئيسة instead of the common mistake of الرئيسية. The argument in this case is that رئيس is already an adjective and it does not need the final (ي) ياء النسبة (P45 – p 136 – ss 173 – 174).

**The Genius of Arabic**

A defining characteristic of Arabic verbal sentences is that they start with a verb instead of just containing the verb as is the case of English and French. Even though in some writing genres such as journalese, writers may start their sentences with subjects borrowing a foreign style, I opted for verbal sentences in my translation into Arabic as it reflects more the genius of Arabic and it is more suitable for a narration style that characterizes the source text.

Another characteristic of Arabic is the use of multiple synonyms for emphasis. I translated the expression 'had been condescending' as تمادى في الاستعلاء والطغيان in which both الاستعلاء (superiority) and الطغيان (highhandedness) are synonyms. An English grammarian would consider this redundant in English (P1 – p 125 – s 157).

My translation of the expression 'more than two decades' into Arabic as أكثر من عقدين من الزمن reads 'more than two decades of time'. The addition of 'of time' makes the target text read more Arabic (P3 – p 125 – s 158).

Similarly, I use the same argument to justify my addition of the word حالة in the translation of 'in disarray' so that it reads in Arabic 'in a state of disarray' (P9 – p 127 – s 159).

I translated the English expression '… by pointing to the chaos and uncertainties in post-Qaddafi Libya, post-Mubarak Egypt, and post-Saleh Yemen." with the use of the

Arabic verb بـ التذرّع. While in other instances I illustrated how Arabic emphasizes meaning by the 'redundancy' of synonyms, Arabic can be so concise and more expressive due to its derivative system. بـ التذرَّع is a verb created from the noun ذريعة (pretext) to express the idea of 'using as a pretext'. This derivative form is like the addition of the suffix '-ize' in English such as 'rationalize', but this derivative system is a distinctive feature of Arabic—another instance that demonstrates the Genius of Arabic (P5 – pp. 125 – 126 – s 158).

I translated 'hardship' into Arabic with the plural form مصاعب that means 'difficulties' despite of the existence of equivalent abstract concepts to 'hardship' such as عسر. The use of concrete expressions instead of abstraction is something Arabic grammarians know as a distinctive feature of Arabic. Another excellent example is when English uses 'youth', Arabic uses the plural شباب (young persons) (P9 – p 127 – s 159).

Arabic is less Cartesian than both English and French, hence the minimal use of punctuation marks. In my translation, the interpolated phrase, "…- and still-…" becomes part of the Arabic sentence in كان ولايزال هناك شعور بالضيق as a translation of "…there was - and still is - continuing… malaise…" (P44 – p 125 – s 173).

**Narratives and Stories**

*Revisiting Past Events*

My translation decisions and linguistic choices were enormously informed by a heightened awareness of how Layachi's narratives were constructed in his chapter. Since Algeria was not affected by the wave of popular uprisings called 'the Arab Spring' at the time Layachi was writing his chapter he adopted an approach of narration that I needed to replicate in my translation. This approach rested upon the revisiting of past events to appropriate them into the then current super-narrative of 'the Arab Spring'. In the following examples, I show how I managed to use the same linguistic techniques of this approach to reproduce the source narratives through translation.

First, Layachi highlighted the similarities between the motives of Algerians to revolt in 1988 and those of the North African youth especially in Tunisia in the popular protests of 2011 in order to weave a through line between 1988 Algeria and 2011 Tunisia. In Layachi's words,

"It was in this context that the country experienced the worst riots since independence during the month of October 1988. Just like in the popular protests of 2011, the 1988 Algerian rioters demanded the end of a system that was self-serving, condescending, unresponsive, and authoritarian." (P17 – pp. 128 – 129 – s 162).

Translated into Arabic as:

"شهدت في هذا السياق البلاد في تشرين الأول/ أكتوبر 1988 أسوأ أعمال شغب لها منذ الاستقلال. فعلى غرار مطالب الاحتجاجات الشعبية لعام 2011، طالب الجزائريون أيضا بتنحية نظام تمادى في استبداده، وكان لا يخدم سوى مصالحة الذاتية."

(P17 – pp. 128 – 129 – s 162).

I expressed the Arabic translation with an emphasis on 'Just like in…" translated as على غرار... insofar as it achieves the same narrative effect of the source that is an invitation of the reader to contemplate the similarities between the two uprisings even though they took place 22 years apart from each other.

Second, Layachi adopted a striking linguistic technique in narration that exemplifies another case of appropriation of a past event into the master narrative of 'the Arab Spring'. The author referred to an uprising that took place in the Berber Kabylie region that started on the 10th of March 1980 as a "Berber Spring". While I could not say for sure whether the Kabylie uprisings of 1980 were widely known as 'Berber Spring' in 1980, I was aware while conducting my translation that Layachi's use of the term 'Berber Spring' meant to imbue this past event with the aura of the then current Arab Spring. As a translator, I chose to reproduce the same narrative effect in my translation for the sake of faithfulness to the source according to my relative standards as shown in the example:

English source,

"Twenty years earlier the Berber cultural demands prompted a major showdown with the state in what became known as the 'Berber Spring.'" (P23 – p 130 – s 164).

Arabic translation:

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"في وقت سبق بعشرين عاماً أدت المطالب الثقافية البربرية إلى مواجهة كبرى مع الدولة في ما أصبح يعرف باسم 'الربيع البربري'.[7]." (P23 – p 130 – s 164).

It is worth mentioning that the Arabic editor added a footnote (7) to my Arabic translation defining the 'Berber Spring'.

Third, an insightful observer would be remiss not to notice the lack of the words terrorism and terrorists when speaking of the 90's Algeria despite of the Algerian regime's preference of these terms when currently referring to the same events. Not only does this observation show the author's adopted political standing vis-à-vis what became to be known as the *décennie noire*, but it also evidences the enmeshing of the Algerian narrative into the Arab Spring's master narrative. Layachi's choice to mute terrorism lexical field was coupled with a tendency to highlight the Arab Spring's lexical field such as insurrection, rebels, protests… etc. (P25 – pp 130-131 – s 165). My observation as a translator is meant to assess the source's argument as much as considering the tone of the author in rewriting his work in translation.

Fourth, Algeria witnessed some protests following the Tunisian uprising of 2011 due to primarily an impending price hike of basic staples, but Layachi claims that Algerians were also inspired by the Tunisians in his words, "… they were inspired by the unfolding Tunisian mass protests." (P48 - p 137 – ss 174 – 175). Again, my job as a translator was not to assess the claim as much as to express my own interpretation of the source text and not to take the emphasis on the expressed causality between Tunisia's events and the Algerian protests for granted. I expressed this emphasis in Arabic as مستوحية من الاحتجاجات الجماهيرية في تونس …" (P48 - p 137 – ss 174 – 175). Thus, the involvement of the translator

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with the text transcends the mere interpretation of the words. As a matter of fact, the words are only slaves to several masters; paramount among them is the master narrative.

*How Narrative Works*

The agency of the translator is most exercised when he or she is fully aware of what his or her work does. While conducting my translation, I was struck by what each narrative I was translating could do in shaping the target reader's perception, awareness and ultimately his or her behavior. Moreover, while Layachi ably argued that Algeria's exception to the Arab Spring was fragile, citing several strategies employed by the regime to perpetuate this state of exception, my critical reading as a translator revealed another strategy: an unconventional field of battle in which the Algerian regime has been relentlessly fighting. It is in this field that what I call the battle of narratives takes place.

The Algerian regime has been aware of the desperate situation in which the Algerian youth find themselves. They have been stranded between an unresponsive political system and the difficulty to leave the country, which could lead them to street violence (P46 – p 136 – s 174). So, the Algerian regime set its narrative machine in motion to dissuade the youth from violence. For instance, reminding them of the bloody and violent days of the 90's and portraying the whole 'Arab Spring' as a complot orchestrated from the West. This narrative machine relies heavily on translation whether between French and Arabic or English into these two languages. At the time of this writing, Algerian Arabic newspapers have just reported that many 'Arab Spring' related books will not be on the stands of the 21st edition of the International Book Fair of Algiers to be held between the 27th October and the 05th November 2016, which is the only yearly international book

fair in Algeria. This type of censorship is also another tool of the regime's narrative machine.

The translation mediated battle of narratives persists even beyond the timeframe of the so called Arab Spring. Layachi reiterates that, "As the institutional setting remains fairly closed to political dissent and protest, people have decided to take matters in their own hands." Translated as  ‫بسبب غلق بقايا منافذ المحيط المؤسسي على المعارضة السياسية والاحتجاج،‬ ‫أخذ الناس زمام الأمور على عاتقهم."‬ (P69 – p 143 – s 184). Yet, as of the time of this writing, we have not seen a major revolt in Algeria, which means that the Algerian exception is persisting. An interested observer may advance several reasons, but the fact that the Algerian regime has not disengaged from the battle of narratives is most relevant to my argument. This engagement is best exemplified in the tendency of the regime to disseminate the horrifying stories of violence and politicized conflict from Syria and Yemen in the Algerian mainstream media, the latter strives on translation from major international press agencies.

Translation mediated narratives can have powerful effects such as normalizing the unusual. Layachi's comment on riots in Algeria is a fine case in point,

"Riots in Algeria have become such a regular occurrence that not a single day passes without more than one riot occurring somewhere in the country."

which I translated into Arabic as,

‫"لم تكن أعمال شغب كانون الثاني/ يناير 2011 سابقةً السنوات الأخيرة بل أصبح الشغب حدثا عاديا لا يكاد يمر يوم‬ ‫واحد من دون أن تشهد منطقة من البلاد ثورانه."‬ (174 s – 136 p – P47).

while this story exposes the ineffectiveness of riots in Algeria even the immunity of the regime to it, a translation mediated counter-narrative would be to render the usual unusual. This technique has already proven successful in constructing the narrative of Tunisia's Mohamed Bouazizi's incident of self-immolation as being exceptional. Certainly, the self-immolation in itself was unprecedented, but the act of expressing anger against the despotic regimes of North Africa dates back to the time of their inception. The self-immolation was successful largely because it was sold to the West through translation, and re-sold to Tunisians through back-translation imbued with 'the unusual' mark. This is the reason censorship is working in Algeria. When an ordinary Algerian flips the papers in the morning, he or she unconsciously disregards a reported dissent simply because it is 'normal' in Algeria. Translation has the power of creating dissatisfaction within people and rendering the 'normal' unacceptable, hence its role in activism and resistance.

The power of narrative in normalizing an extraordinary policy may be illustrated in the enactment and the lifting of the state of emergency in Algeria as well. Layachi noted that, "Furthermore, the lifting of the state of emergency did not mean the end of the arbitrary curtailment of liberties since many restrictive regulations remained in place." (P50 – p 138 – f. 175), which I translated into Arabic as,

"وعلاوة على ذلك، فإن رفع حالة الطوارئ لا يعني نهاية تضييق الحريات التعسفي فلا تزال كثير من اللوائح المقيدة داخل حيز التنفيذ." (P50 – p 138 – f. 175).

While the people became accustomed to the restrictive regulations of the state of emergency in effect for years, they did not expect more liberty after the announcement of its lifting, although solely linguistically.

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The Algerian regime has been legitimizing itself since the independence based on revolutionary legitimacy narratives. This approach has been proving very effective even during flagrant un-democratic incidents in Algeria such as Boumediène's coup in 1965, the 90's military intervention to curb the Islamists' ascension to power or even the most recent forced constitutional amendment in 2014 to grant the ailing Algerian president a fourth term. Layachi, however, quotes the Algerian sociologist Nasser Djabi's observation that, "the current [Algerian] generation's preoccupations are more economic and social and less ideological and political." (P71 – p 143 – s 184). From a narrativity point of view, the narrative ground is not to the advantage of the regime anymore because the current audience is likely to be less receptive to any ideology-based stories for legitimacy as it has been the case with the fading post-independence generation. While Layachi comments that, "[the current generation] is more concerned with its own immediate needs in terms of education, jobs…" (P71 – p 143 – s 184), one may explain that this very change in concerns by the disruption of the regime's narrative channels such as schools and mosques. The current Algerian youth feed their spirits through the almost uncontrollable new heavily translation-mediated social media. Technology disrupted the battle of narratives ground to the advantage of the people by becoming mostly virtual, and translation is certainly playing a role in circulating and producing counter-narratives that undermine the legitimacy narrative machine of the regime.

The Algerian regime enjoys boasting about its unique experience in eliminating Islamist extremism, an experience that the regime is pleased to share internationally. What the international community can also learn from the Algerian experience is how this regime

set the stage for the Islamists to come to the fore in the first place. Layachi drew this context in his words,

"As a result of the botched liberalization reforms of the early 1980s and a major decline of the national income by the end of that decade, the living standards of ordinary citizens degraded dramatically; a substantial black market developed; illegal activities and crime rates increased; corruption set in. In this context, uncontrolled Islamist groups began imposing moral and behavioral restrictions in public places." (P16 – p 128 – s 162).

I translated this into Arabic as,

"نتيجة لفشل إصلاحات تحرير الاقتصاد في أوائل الثمانينات، والانخفاض الكبير في الدخل القومي مع نهاية ذلك العقد، تدهورت مستويات معيشة المواطنين العاديين بشكل كبير، ونمت السوق السوداء بشكل كبير أيضاً، وانتشرت الأنشطة غير المشروعة، وزادت معدلات الجريمة والفساد. في هذا السياق، بدأت الجماعات الإسلامية في فرض ضوابط سلوكية وأخلاقية في الأماكن العامة." (162 s – 128 p – P16).

The circulation of this narrative can be very instructive in understanding the origin of extremism and why it took an 'Islamic' character in Algeria. There is a shared belief in Algeria that the victory of the liberation revolution against colonial France was partly due to Islam's call to fight for one's dignity, a narrative that extremists easily exploited for mobilization by claiming 'an Islamic' agenda during the 90's. Amid an economic and social chaos, the Algerian youth felt that the post-independence regime violated their dignity again after a long colonial period, so they took to the streets during the 90's heeding the calls of Islamists. Peaceful means were not an option either since they were ineffective against the French. This very narrative has been subject to manipulation repeatedly by the Algerian regime whether to demonize the Islamists or to justify questionable policies to

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the West. For both purposes translation mediated the linguistic circulation of the manipulated narrative.

Another exportable strategy of using translation-mediated narratives at which the Algerian regime excelled is how to tame political Islam. Layachi lays out this strategy in his words,

"Another way of looking at this evolution of political Islam in Algeria is that "the regime has successively neutered… the main Islamist parties, allowing them to participate in elections and including them in governing coalitions, tempting them with the fruits of power, and then watching their support slump as they compromise to stay in Parliament." According to Khemissi, Larémont and Taj Eddine, this strategy has also been employed at the level of municipal councils where Islamist parties were allowed to participate. "When these councils failed to deliver positive results, youth became further distanced from Islamist parties. In this process, Islamist parties have acquired the same level of disdain or skepticism that secularly oriented political parties have encountered."" (P35 – p 133 – s 169)

Which I translated as,

"هناك زاوية أخرى للنظر إلى تطور الإسلام السياسي في الجزائر هي "أن النظام قد حيّد... الاحزاب الاسلامية الرئيسة عن طريق السماح لهم بالمشاركة في الانتخابات وتضمينها في الائتلاف الحاكم، الأمر الذي أغراها بثمار السلطة، فقط ليشهدوا تراجع دعمهم الشعبي بسبب تقديم تنازلات للبقاء في البرلمان." [11] وفقاً للاريمونت وخميسي وتاج الدين، تم توظيف هذه الاستراتيجية كذلك على مستوى المجالس البلدية حيث سُمح للأحزاب الإسلامية بالمشاركة فيها "وعندما تفشل هذه المجالس في تحقيق نتائج إيجابية يفقد الشباب الثقة فيهم. أدت هذه

العملية الى الاستخفاف بالأحزاب الإسلامية والتشكيك بها وهو نفس المصير الذي لقيته الأحزاب السياسية ذات التوجه العلماني." [12] (P35 – p 133 – s 169).

The import of translating this narrative has a double effect. On the one hand, it exports a successful political strategy to other Arab countries on how to deal with their own Islamist parties. On the other hand, it raises the awareness of the public as to how the Algerian regime manipulates Islamist parties and that the failure of the latter is not due to an inherent inability of political Islam to lead as the regime wishes to portray.

Translation in the sense of circulating counter-narratives across the linguistic, cultural and geographical divides proves to be an effective catalyzer of dissent and resistance especially in political regimes that seem to be politically unshakeable such as the Algerian one. While the Algerian regime is engaged in this battle of narratives through censorship and other intimidation techniques, the virtual platform of circulation does not lend itself to linear inculcation of the regime's self-sustaining narratives. The interactive platform of blogs, vlogs and social networks always have backdoors to voice one's opinion. Even high quality translations are not required to pass along a potential counter-narrative, for instance a shared YouTube's video showing contrasting living conditions between the youth in the West and the Algerian youth may need just a quick comment in the local language to transmit the message. Sometimes even a picture with no comments may be considered a translation just by considering the context in which it is shared. The Algerian youth are taking advantage of these revolutionary means and the regime's road of least resistance is to hear the youth's voice loud and clear.

Translation should not be regarded as an agency of dissent only; it may be as effective in mending the generational schism in Algeria. The regime's recognition that its

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legitimacy narrative machine is obsolete would be a positive step towards the right change. While Layachi does not rule out yet another armed rebellion in Algeria should there be a blunder on the part of the state and its agents (P76 – p 144 – f. 186), the Algerian State may choose to steer its narrative machine towards the construction of another legitimacy of another regime that can be brought by more innovative, peaceful approaches based on the lessons of the past.

**Translation Politics**

My translation of Laychi's chapter is the result of decisions I made based on a political awareness as well., none of these choices is arbitrary. From my interpretation of the text, I could understand Layachi's agenda, his ideology, and his positions towards some historical events. Although any interpretation of a text is arguably subjective, I argue that my translation product is still objective and neutral- at least relatively. Despite of my claimed objectivity and neutrality, I do not claim to be invisible. My visibility is in the choice I made to 'replicate' the same political import. Therefore, I see no incongruity between my visibility and my neutrality to the extent of my translation being the result of my choice that is always relative as illustrated in the following examples.

Layachi refers to the annulation of the parliamentary vote by the army of 1992 as 'a military intervention', which I translated literally into Arabic as التدخل العسكري. When it comes to a military 'intervention' to disrupt a democratic process, it can be called otherwise, but Layachi still called it 'an intervention' that signals a position towards a historical event that I replicated in my translation. Take for instance another major event in Algeria that the FLN, the dominant political party in Algeria since the independence, has been referring to as a تصحيح ثوري or a 'revolutionary adjustment' while some academics still refer to the same event of 19 April 1965 as 'a coup d'état', which marked the ascension of late president *Boumediène* to power by overthrowing the first Algerian president *Ahmed Ben Bella*. This case demonstrates that the linguistic choice is inseparable from the political

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one and in my view if the translator chooses to subscribe to the expressed political position of the author despite of the translator's convictions, he or she can claim a 'relative' neutrality (P24 – p 130 – ss 164 – 165).

A similar and rather striking case is president *el-Sisi*'s 'military intervention' to overthrow former president *Mohamed Morsi*. Now, is it a 'military intervention', a coup d'état or some sort of adjustment? In translation, it is what the author says it is. Is the translator invisible then? The translator is still visible by choosing first to translate. Choosing not to translate or choosing to translate a competing narrative is what makes translation political and the translator an active agent in this case either an activist or a propagandist. I discussed the intersection between translation and activism in the section on how narrative works.

Sometimes choosing one word or the other changes one's political view, hence the translator should always be aware of its implications. I translated the Maghreb into Arabic as المنطقة المغاربية. Although the Maghreb is sometimes known as المغرب العربي (The Arab Maghreb), I chose to use the plural adjective here first to differentiate the region of North Africa from المغرب (Morocco) and second to avoid a potential gain in the target that the reader might understand as an advocacy for the unity of 'the Arab Maghreb'. An advocate of Pan-Arabism agenda would refer to the North African region as المغرب العربي and the MENA region as الوطن العربي (the Arab World) (P30 – p 132 – s 168).

Another case of labelling for political purposes is how Moroccan media outlets never refer to Western Sahara الصحراء الغربية as such and they call the disputed territory الصحراء المغربية (the Moroccan Sahara). It is worth to note for the English reader that both adjectives 'Moroccan' and 'Western' come from the same root in Arabic (غ-ر-ب). The

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implications of this specific issue can also be illustrated in the book cover of the Arabic translation that shows the Moroccan map separate from that of Western Sahara. One cannot take these apparently 'linguistic' choices for granted in translation as their political import is inevitable.

Sometimes the challenge of the word choice that the translator should make lies in one language and not the other. Take, for instance, the use of a single adjective in Arabic إسلامي for two adjectives in English Islamist and Islamic. While in English the difference is made in the form, the reader of the Arabic needs to guess the difference from the context. When the context does not lend itself to an easy interpretation, the translator faces the challenge of highlighting it through other techniques such as the addition of 'radical' or 'moderate'. Even the use of 'radical' and 'moderate' can be more problematic politically than the linguistic problems they may solve. It is not a matter of political correctness since this correctness is determined by many factors paramount among them is the time at which the translation is performed. In this chapter, Layachi uses in the English both 'radical' and 'moderate' to differentiate between violence-embracing and violence-rejecting Islamists, so my use of إسلامي in translation is not as problematic as it could have been in less context distinct situations (P26 – p 132 – ss 166).

The translator's political sensitivity needs to be observed even at the phonetic level, which would require an even higher level of awareness of the translation's import. Take for instance the peculiar case of the Islamist party حركة مجتمع السلم abbreviated as (حمس) known also the MSP in French. The abbreviation can be read either as حمس that is *Hims* or حَمَس that is *Hamas*. The latter use was a very common currency in the early 90's and the party's intention was to convey to the electorate its ties with Gaza's Hamas and Egypt's

Brotherhood, but after the unprecedented violence during the 90's Algeria, the pronunciation shifted to the former *Hims* to linguistically cut the alleged ties. Sensitivity to such issues in translation is not a question of mere linguistic competence. While the linguistic competence of the translator is a prerequisite, the familiarity with the political implications gives an advantage to a translator over another. (P26 – p 132 – ss 166)

I could make an observation during the process of my translation that goes beyond the mere translation proper, yet intimately tied to one of the translator's major challenges namely translating ambiguity. Layachi mentions in his chapter an incongruity regarding the pre-1997 constitutional amendment. This amendment declared that 'Islam was the State's religion', yet the constitution prohibited the creation of parties based on a religious basis (P27 – p 131 – ss 166 – 167). While a political scientist may advance some speculations regarding the inconsistency between the text and its application, a translation scholar, instead of explaining the why, he or she would engage in contemplating the political import of such incongruity. Furthermore, when legal texts are mediated through translation, the stakes of the translator are even higher. Practicing translators are sometimes faced with the challenge of translating ambiguous texts. Understanding that this text ambiguity is intended to postpone some privileged interpretation, the act of translation should not be then an act of interpretation to avoid unintended consequences of the act of translating. However, when translation transforms ambiguity into a fixed interpretation, it becomes a political act par excellence and analyzing this act of translation greatly informs of the hidden power structures. In the case of the Algerian constitution, this ambiguity enabled the government to accept or reject any party based on a subjective interpretation, which informs the contemplator that the regime is above the constitution.

I had the choice between ولاية and عهدة in my translation of the word 'term' in 'presidential term'. Privileging one over the other does not impact the linguistic meaning. However, ولاية is more common in the Levant, Egypt and the Golf while عهدة is used more frequently in North Africa (P29 – p 132 – s 167).

I personally had an experience of this very word choice being challenged by a Syrian UN senior interpreter during a training I undertook previously. When I explained that عهدة is the common equivalent in Algeria, the person insisted that ولاية is the word to go. The next week day, the person came up to me and recognized the second use just after accidentally heard the famous Aljazeera journalist *Khadija Benguenna*, who happened to be Algerian, using عهدة instead of ولاية.

The value of such observation is that it makes it possible to investigate the linguistic distribution of the demographic representation and its authority in setting 'the right' language use through translation. The results of such research can be used to shed light on the politics of diversity based on linguistic differences and study how these linguistic differences can influence the bias in administering, proctoring, and correcting competitive examinations for instance.

**The Translator's Advantage**

The translation process entails some decisions that are informed by the translator's background, hence assigning a writing to a translator with the advantage of the appropriate background produces a better translation.

Linguistic competence is necessary, but not sufficient most of the times. Take for instance the idea of 'migration to cities', while it can be perfectly expressed literally in Arabic as الهجرة الى المدن, the appropriate way of expressing it in the Algerian context is النزوح الريفي that literally reads 'exodus from the countryside'. I made this choice not based on a linguistic competence, but I took this informed decision based on the advantage of my educational background that took place in Algeria (P12 – pp 127 – 128 – s 160).

Similarly, I translated 'the one-party system' into Arabic as نظام الحزب الواحد. I made this choice automatically and I did not hesitate for instance to consider نظام حزب واحد, which still conveys the absence of a multi-party system, but it is not the conventional name of the FLN-run regime. The advantage of being exposed to the Algerian media made my choice more informed (P2 – p 125 – s 158).

### Untranslatable Concepts

Layachi used the word *Hogra* in the English version as a transliteration of the Algerian vernacular حقرة with a short definition in English. I kept the back translation at the vernacular register because it would lose its connotation otherwise. I consider *Hogra* an untranslatable term. While defining it to the English reader as an "abuse of power" تعسّف السلطة is an attempt to convey the meaning, it does not do justice to the social investment in the word. It is a sort of abuse of power that is specific to Algerians as a community. Since the colonial period, most Algerians have been suffering from discrimination from the claimed superiority of the French just to see another minority monopolizing similar privileges under the name of the revolutionary legitimacy. The feeling of contempt towards the abuser is what is left behind in the English, which is the emotional investment of the people in the language. A quick analysis like this may raise questions such as: Is language inseparable of the social investment of its natives? If the answer is yes, could we say that the act of translation has always been impossible? (P1 – p 125 – f 157).

It is worth noting that a comparatist reading of both Aleya-Sghaier's chapter on Tunisia and Layachi's chapter on Algeria shows that the youth from both sides of the border have been suffering from the same malaise. While Tunisians express it as an infringed dignity, Algerian youth refer to this infringement as *Hogra* الحقرة. In this sense, boht peoples have been sharing the same predisposition to claim back a lost dignity or remedy a society's injustice (P49 – p 137 – s 175).

Similarly, Algerians use the French word '*le pouvoir*' that can literally be translated into English as 'state authority' to refer to, in the words of Layachi, 'the real, unelected power holders in Algeria.'. I kept '*le pouvoir*' in my Arabic translation and provided the translation of the succinct definition of its use by Layachi to recreate the same effects of this use for my Arabic readers. Furthermore, '*le pouvoir*' reflects the codeswitching reality of Algerians using the Algerian vernacular and French—A trait that is not to be muted. Therefore, I consider '*le pouvoir*' an untranslatable term as well (P52 – p 138 – ss 176 - 177). It is worth mentioning the use of the term *Makhzen* by the Moroccan ordinary subjects to refer to the abuse of power by the members of the kingdom's establishment as another example of untranslatable terms and an equivalent to the Algerians' '*le pouvoir*'.

*Harga* is another term that I consider untranslatable. The author defined it as,

'[the] illegal migration to Europe by way of the sea. This dangerous form of exit has caused many deaths yet it remains an attractive alternative for many people with no hope of ever having a decent life in Algeria.' (P57 – p 149 s 177).

Which I translated into Arabic as,

"محاولات الهجرة غير الشرعية لأوروبا عن طريق البحر والمعروفة باسم "الحرقة". يسفر هذا الشكل الخطير من الهروب عن العديد من الوفيات، ولا تزال حتى الآن بديلا جذابا لكثير من الناس الذين فقدوا الأمل في عيش حياة كريمة في الجزائر."(P57 – p 149 s 177)

My understanding is that Layachi's choice to use *Harga* is primarily motivated by the lack of an equivalent term in English. While providing a definition of the foreign enriches the reader's semantic understanding, the use of the foreign paves the way for empathy. I

believe that empathy is higher ideal than understanding. I chose to keep *Harga* as is in my formal Arabic translation for this purpose.

It is my belief that among the main characteristics of untranslatable terms is that they are inextricable from the social and emotional investments of a certain community. Any attempt to mute, domesticate or simply raise the register of the term leaves a whole community behind. One may think of *Hogra, le pouvoir* (or *Makhzen* in Morocco), and *Harga* as deeply enmeshed investments in the Algerian social fabric the way *Nakba*, for instance, is to the Palestinian community.

**Final Words**

The Arab Spring has shown so far that breaking the order for the sake of change is not the most efficacious of options. The MENA regimes are fully equipped with all the tools of repression and intimidation to inhibit any process that could threaten the powerful leaders with vested interests in the status quo. The dangerous degeneration of the Syrian conflict is another reason to avoid the path of violence at all costs as well. A real 'spring' in the Arab world is, however, more potent when the change comes from within the individuals to reclaim their dignity and setting themselves free of the shackles of the rogue interpretations of Islam, the relics of the colonial past, and the peaceful acceptance of the new realities. This process requires the re-writing of novel narratives with the potential of changing a community's constructed past and aspired future; an approach that can be enormously facilitated by the agency of translation.

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# CHAPTER III

## TRANSLATION OF THE CHAPTER ON ALGERIA

# الفصل الخامس

## الجزائر: الاستثناء المتعذِّر إدراكه في ربيع الاضطرابات

عز الدين العيّاشي(*)

### مُقدّمة

أخذ الآلاف من الشباب فجأة إلى الشوارع في العديد من المدن الجزائرية ليطالبوا بالتغيير السياسي والاقتصادي الفوريين، حيث خلقت ظروف معيشتهم الكئيبة التي انطوت على ارتفاع معدلات البطالة، والاستياء من النظام التعليمي الفاشل، وصعوبة التواصل مع صانعي السياسات ومؤسساتهم، والافتقار إلى الترفيه والمرافق الرياضية وأنشطتها، والشعور العميق باليأس والعجز. ثاروا ضد نظام سلطوي يقوده جيل طاعن في السن تمادى في الاستعلاء والطغيان. تمرد الشباب ضد الظلم وما وصفوه «بالحقرة»، وهي (إساءة استخدام السلطة العامة، وبخاصة من الشرطة والجيش والدولة والبيروقراطيين)[1].

اجتاحت أعمال شغب الشباب المدن الجزائرية الرئيسة بسرعة، وقمع الجيش هذه الأعمال بقسوة، تاركاً ٥٠٠ قتيل من الشباب في غضون أيام قليلة. وكانت هذه الأحداث الأخطر عنفاً منذ استقلال الجزائر عن فرنسا في

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(*) أستاذ العلوم السياسية بجامعة سانت جونز، نيويورك.

(1) للاطلاع على مناقشة ممتازة لأصول ومعنى الفكرة الجزائرية «الحقرا» أنظر: ,Amel Blidi
«C'estl'injustice et l'humiliation de tous les jours: La hogra, un mal algérien,» El Watan, June
7, 2012. Consulted on June 7, 2012. There is also a website dedicated to this notion: Hogra en
Algerie at: < http://hogra.centerblog.net/ > .

عام ١٩٦٢. تقريباً بعد ذلك مباشرة، وبعد أن أدرك النظام خطورة التمرد، قرر قادة الدولة إدخال تغييرات سياسية كبيرة، بما في ذلك إنهاء نظام الحزب الواحد، وفتح النظام الانتخابي، وسن قوانين جديدة تسمح بولادة أحزاب جديدة جنباً إلى جنب مع حرية تأسيس الجمعيات واستقلال الصحافة المطبوعة.

مع هذه التدابير وغيرها، وبتكلفة فادحة في الأرواح البشرية، كان للجزائر «ربيعها» الخاص؛ إلا أن هذا الربيع لم ينتظر عام ٢٠١١، بل سبق ذلك بأكثر من عقدين من الزمن، حيث جرت أعمال الشغب هذه في تشرين الأول/أكتوبر ١٩٨٨ وأوائل عام ١٩٨٩، كما سيناقش في هذا الفصل. وشهدت الجزائر تغييرات سياسية مهمة خلال عامي ١٩٨٨ و١٩٨٩، لكن لم يتم تقويض الحكم الاستبدادي بالكامل.

في أوائل الأيام التي اصطلح على تسميتها «الربيع العربي» كان للجزائر أيضاً نصيبُها من أعمال الشغب التي وقعت في الشوارع خلال شهر كانون الثاني/يناير ٢٠١١، لكن كانت هذه الاضطرابات قصيرة العمر، ومن دون أهمية من الناحية السياسية. منذ ذلك الحين كانت الجزائر في منأى عن التغييرات الهائلة التي اجتاحت المنطقة على الرغم من الشعور بالضيق الذي ابتليت به البلاد.

بعد خمسين عاماً من الاستقلال، تواجه الجزائر اليوم مفترق طرق رئيساً، تميز بطفرات اجتماعية مهمة، وعدم الاستقرار الاقتصادي، على الرغم من ثروة النفط والغاز، والتصلب السياسي الخطير. السؤال الذي يُطرح في الوقت الحاضر هو ما إذا كانت القيادة الحالية ستستجيب لنداءات التغيير أم إنها ستحاول الإبحار مع الرياح الإقليمية من دون إحداث إصلاحات جادة، على أمل شراء صمت الناس من خلال ضخّ أكثر لدولارات النفط في مشاريع شعبوية، والتذرّع بالفوضى وعدم الاستقرار في ليبيا ما بعد القذافي، ومصر ما بعد مبارك، واليمن ما بعد صالح.

يناقش هذا الفصل، الذي يركّز على الجزائر خلال «الربيع العربي ٢٠١١»، هذا الشأن ومسائل أخرى، بما في ذلك تفسير لماذا لا يبدو هذا البلد متأثراً بالاضطرابات الاجتماعية التي وقعت في المغرب العربي والشرق الأوسط، وخصوصاً تونس وليبيا المجاورة، وتتشارك في الثقافة والعادات،

على الرغم من قدرة هذه الاضطرابات على إسقاط أنظمة استبدادية امتد حكمها لعقود في المنطقة.

سلكت الجزائر مساراً مختلفاً، فاختارت استخدام دخل نفطها وغازها لتلبية المطالب الاجتماعية الفورية، ووعدت بالإصلاح السياسي، وأشارت إلى عدم الاستقرار في ليبيا وتونس ومصر وسوريا واليمن كحجة لحسن عدم اتخاذ الخطوة الأولى من «الربيع العربي» في الجزائر. وبالطبع فإن الأمور ليست بهذه البساطة. وسيحاول هذا الفصل توضيح حالة الجزائر «الاستثنائية».

لكي نفهم موقع الجزائر في خضمّ «الربيع العربي»، وكيف كان رد فعلها، وعما إذا كانت ستتأثر في نهاية المطاف بذلك، علينا العودة إلى النظام السياسي والاقتصادي الذي صمّمته ونفّذته قيادة البلاد في وقت مبكر؛ سيتضمن ذلك وصف وتحليل بروز هذا النظام السياسي وفشله في الارتقاء إلى مستوى وعوده الخاصة بسبب استراتيجيته التنموية الاقتصادية غير الملائمة، التي اعتمدت بشكل مفرط على النفط والغاز باعتبارهما مصدراً وحيداً للدخل وسياسة الحزب الواحد المغلقة. وسيدرس هذا الفصل أيضاً نتائج ما شاب محاولة التحرير الاقتصادي التي انتُهجت في الثمانينيات والانفجار الاجتماعي الذي أعقب ذلك في عام ١٩٨٨. كانت أعمال شغب عام ١٩٨٨ نتيجة المصاعب الاقتصادية التي نتجت من الانخفاض الحادّ في إيرادات النفط والغاز الذي بدأ في عام ١٩٨٦ والقيادة الاستبدادية التي كانت في حالة من الفوضى.

يحلل القسم الثاني طبيعة التحرر السياسي وحدوده الذي جرى في أواخر الثمانينيات، حيث أُطلق عليه من قبل البعض «بالانفجار الكبير في التحرر السياسي»، ومن قبل البعض الآخر «الربيع الجزائري» وهو «الربيع» الذي دخل فصله قبل فصل «الربيع العربي» ٢٠١١ بوقت طويل. وسيحلل هذا القسم كذلك الأحداث التي تلت، وبشكل رئيس بروز الإسلام السياسي ونجاحه الساحق في انتخابات ١٩٩١، والتي ألغاها انقلاب ١٩٩٢ العسكري، والعشرية السوداء اللاحقة التي شهدت حرباً داخلية دمّرت البلاد وعبادها. أما القسم الثالث فسيعالج الظروف الاقتصادية والإصلاحات.

بمجرد رسم هذه الخلفية، سيكون من المناسب وضع رد فعل الجزائر تجاه «الربيع العربي» في سياقة في جزء رابع من الفصل. وسيتم في هذا الجزء

تحليل انتخابات أيار/مايو ٢٠١٢ البرلمانية، وأهميتها في سياق الديناميات الإقليمية. القسم الأخير سينظر في ما قد يكون في مخزون مستقبل الجزائر القريب في ظل الظروف الاجتماعية والاقتصادية السائدة، فضلاً عن الديناميات المحلية والإقليمية.

## أولاً: الفشل المنهجي وأعمال شغب عام ١٩٨٨

بعد الاستقلال وتجنُّب الرأسمالية باعتبارها نموذجاً اقتصادياً بسبب ارتباطها بعدم المساواة والظلم والاستعمار، اختارت الجزائر نمطاً اشتراكياً في التنمية، الأمر الذي وضع كل القرارات الاجتماعية والاقتصادية في أيدي الدولة، التي أصبحت مسؤولة عن التوظيف، والإنتاج، والرعاية، والحماية الاجتماعية. مع نهاية السبعينيات كان البلد دولة موحدة، بنظام سياسي مستقر، واقتصاد صناعي متنامٍ، وبرنامج دولة مركزي اشتراكي، وصناعة نفطية وغازية متوسعة التصدير. ومع ذلك أثبتت استراتيجية التنمية في وقت مبكر من الثمانينيات أنها غير قادرة على التعامل مع التراجع الاقتصادي الذي تسببت به عوامل عدة، بما في ذلك عدم تحفيز مجمع الصناعات الثقيلة غير الفاعل والمتضخم للنمو الاقتصادي، كما كان مخططاً له، وأهمل في الوقت نفسه القطاع الزراعي، ما أدى إلى انخفاض مطرد في الإنتاج، والاعتماد على الواردات الغذائية، الذي نتج منه نقص المواد الغذائية المتكرر المتفاقم بسبب النزوح الريفي. ويضاف إلى هذا المزيج المتفجر، خلال هذه الفترة من النمو السكاني العالي، تقلُّب عائدات الدولة – التي كانت تعتمد على تصدير النفط والغاز إلى حد كبير – بصورة عشوائية منخفضة في نهاية المطاف خلال أواخر الثمانينيات بنسبة ٤٠ في المئة.

لم تفشل الإصلاحات الاقتصادية الأولية خلال الثمانينيات بوقف التدهور فحسب، بل أدت أيضاً إلى تفاقم الوضع السيئ، ولم تقلل من تعرُّض البلاد للصدمات الخارجية. استمرت البطالة بالزيادة إلى جانب التوسع العمراني غير المتساوي، وانخفاض الناتج الصناعي، والزيادة الكبيرة في أسعار المواد الاستهلاكية. كانت الإصلاحات معتلّة وغير متماسكة وجرى تنفيذها بشكل سيئ، حيث ساهمت بتدهور الاقتصاد والظروف الاجتماعية، وهبط الاستثمار الصناعي بنسبة ٢١ في المئة بين عامي ١٩٨٠ و١٩٨١ فقط، وانخفضت

الواردات بنسبة ٣٥ في المئة، وتم تأجيل العديد من المشاريع الصناعية، وأُلغيَ العديد من العقود الدولية.

كانت ظروف الاقتصاد الجزائري في أواخر الثمانينيات مستقطبة للغاية، رافقها انخفاض سريع في إيرادات الصادرات الذي حد من قدرات الدولة الرعائية وسعتها على الحفاظ على الأمن والاستقرار؛ وكانت الديون الخارجية للجزائر تسبب ضغطاً هائلاً على الموارد المالية للدولة، وارتفع مستوى التبعية إلى الخارج من الواردات الغذائية والصادرات الهيدروكربونية على حد سواء. تركت هذه الظروف البلاد عرضة للهزات بشكل خطير.

فقدت الدولة صدقيتها بسبب تردّي الأوضاع الاجتماعية والاقتصادية، ولم تعد قادرة على دعم الخدمات والإعانات السخية التي اعتادها الشعب من قبل، حيث زاد الانسحاب النسبي للدولة من حدة التوتر الاقتصادي، ولم يوقف تدهوره، وأصبح الوضع حرجاً عندما انخفضت أسعار النفط بنسبة ٤٠ في المئة في عام ١٩٨٦. انخفض الناتج الصناعي بشكل كبير بحلول عام ١٩٨٨، وواجهت المؤسسات العامة عجزاً مجموعه ١٨,٥ مليار دولار[٢]. كانت الدولة على وشك الإفلاس بسبب انخفاض كبير في إيرادات النفط والغاز وارتفاع الديون الخارجية وتفاقم عدم المساواة الاجتماعية إلى درجة أن ٤٥ في المئة من الدخل القومي كان يذهب إلى خمسة في المئة من السكان، بينما كان يتقاسم ٥٠ في المئة من السكان ما نسبته ٢٢ في المئة من هذا الدخل[٣]. قدّر معدل التضخم السنوي بنسبة ٤٢ في المئة، وأصبحت نسبة ٢٢ في المئة من قوة العمل عاطلة عن العمل. ساءت الظروف الاجتماعية عندما تم تسريح ١٢٥ ألف عامل إضافي – أغلبيتهم من القطاع العام – عن العمل بحلول عام ١٩٩١[٤]. وعلاوة على ذلك، انتشر الفساد وأصبح كالوباء في أنحاء مؤسسات الدولة كلها[٥]. وبلغ الدين الخارجي ٢٦,٥٥٧ دولاراً

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AbedCharef, Octobre, (Algiers: Laphomic Editions, 1990), p. 16.  (٢)

El Moudjahid, (January 29, 1990).  (٣)

Zakya Daoud, «L'Economie du Maghreb en Difficulté,» Le Monde Diplomatique,  (٤)
(June 1991), p. 26.

(٥) صنف تقرير الشفافية العامي الجزائر في المرتبة ١١٢ من بين ١٨٣ وبدرجة ٢,٩ من ١٠ نقاط (١٠ خالية من الفساد) يمكن الاطلاع على التقرير عن الجزائر في:
<http://www.transparency.org/countryDZA>.

بحلول عام ١٩٩١، مع نسبة ١٩٣ في المئة من أرباح التصدير، و٣٧,٧ في المئة من خدمة الدين[٦].

نتيجة فشل إصلاحات تحرير الاقتصاد في أوائل الثمانينيات، والانخفاض الكبير في الدخل القومي مع نهاية ذلك العقد، تدهورت مستويات معيشة المواطنين العاديين بشكل كبير، ونمت السوق السوداء بشكل كبير أيضاً، وانتشرت الأنشطة غير المشروعة، وزادت معدلات الجريمة والفساد. في هذا السياق، بدأت الجماعات الإسلامية بفرض ضوابط سلوكية وأخلاقية بغير ضوابط في الأماكن العامة. عززت النخبة الحاكمة قوتها السياسية على مر السنين من خلال سهولة استغلالها الاقتصاد الريعي الذي تم إنشاؤه بواسطة الصناعة الهيدروكربونية، حيث قاوم بعض الأعضاء الإصلاحات السياسية التي كان من شأنها أن تهدد مصالحهم، وعارض ذلك أيضاً مديرو الشركات العامة، وكبار البيروقراطيين، وأصحاب النفوذ من المدنيين، وضباط الجيش الذين استفادوا من الحماية الاقتصادية واحتكار قطاع الاستيراد والتصدير المربح. شهدت في هذا السياق البلاد في تشرين الأول/أكتوبر ١٩٨٨ أسوأ أعمال شغب لها منذ الاستقلال. فعلى غرار مطالب الاحتجاجات الشعبية لعام ٢٠١١، طالب الجزائريون أيضاً بتنحية نظامٍ تمادى في استبداده، وكان لا يخدم سوى مصالحه الذاتية.

مع نهاية الثمانينيات فإن ضعف الطابع المؤسسي وحجب الحريات السياسية ورداءة السياسات، والتأثيرات السلبية للتحولات الاجتماعية والاقتصادية الرئيسة، والتفكك التدريجي للتضامن الوطني، إلى جانب خطاب ديني ثوري، أنتج تمرداً شعبياً تحوّل إلى أعمال عنف في أنحاء البلاد كلّها خلال التسعينيات.

## ١ - حدود ونتائج سياسة التحرير الأقتصادي أواخر الثمانينيات

كما هو مبين أعلاه، تلا أعمال شغب تشرين الأول/أكتوبر ١٩٨٨ تحرير سياسي شامل الذي، للأسف، لم يتحول إلى عملية تحوّل ديمقراطي، بل قوّض الديمقراطية أكثر. التحرر السياسي هو عملية تفتح المجال تدريجياً

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The World Bank, World Bank Report 1993, (New York: Oxford University Press, ‏(٦)‏
1993).

للحريات السياسية، وتتخذ بعض الإجراءات الوقائية ضد العمل التعسفي للدولة، أما الديمقراطية فهي على مستوى أعلى من الانفتاح السياسي، يتم من خلالها التخفيف ببطء من سيطرة الدولة على المجتمع، إلى درجة أن الدولة تصبح أقلّ تعسفاً وأكثر استعداداً للمساومة مع المجموعات الرئيسة التي تمثل مختلف المصالح الاجتماعية والاقتصادية والثقافية. وتلجأ الدولة في هذه المرحلة إلى التفاوض حول السياسات العامة أكثر منه إلى تبنّي سياسة التسلط الحكومي.

الديمقراطية هي مجموعة من المؤسسات، وعملية بحدّ ذاتها، وثقافة سياسية تسمح للأفراد والجماعات بالمساهمة المنتظمة في عملية صنع القرارالسياسي. ويتم تقييد ردود الفعل السلطوية للذين يحكمون مؤقتاً عن طريق سياسة مشاركة خاضعة لمساءلة النخبة والتداول المستمر والشفافية في المعاملات الاقتصادية والسياسية. وتتميز الثقافة السياسية في هذه المرحلة بحرية النقاش وتجاوز الخلافات والشفافية والمساءلة في الحكم وتوليد سياسات عامة عن طريق المفاوضات. الديمقراطية هي أيضاً تمكين المواطن من «البحث عن سعادته»، كما هو منصوص عليه في الإعلان عن الاستقلال الأمريكي في كنف ما يقرره المجتمع بحرية وللصالح العام من خلال مؤسساته التمثيلية.

استناداً إلى التعاريف الواردة أعلاه، فإن الانفتاح السياسي في الجزائر بعد أحداث شغب تشرين الأول/أكتوبر ١٩٨٨ كان بداية لعملية التحرر السياسي الذي أنهى نظام الحزب الواحد وفتح الطريق لمجموعة متنوّعة من المنظمات السياسية بالتجمع والتعبير الحر غير المسبوقَيْن. ومع ذلك، لم يستمرّ هذا الانفتاح السياسي المفاجئ والكبير إلا بين عامي ١٩٨٩ و١٩٩١، ولم يصل إلى حد التغيير الديمقراطي، ولا إرساء الديمقراطية، ولا تغيير النظام.

على الرغم من محدوديته، أحدث التحرر السياسي في الجزائر تغييراً لا رجعة فيه على الخريطة السياسية، حيث انتشرت الجمعيات المدنية، وأصبحت تنبض بالحياة السياسية في الجزائر، وأدت المنظمات – المتمثلة أساساً بالصحفيين والنساء والمدافعين عن حقوق الإنسان ونقابات التجار المستقلين – دوراً مهماً في سنوات التحرر السياسي. على الرغم من نكسات التسعينيات

بسبب العنف السياسي من الجماعات الإسلامية وقمع الدولة، أصبحت هذه المنظمات أحد رموز البيئة السياسية الجزائرية، وهي تشكل اليوم مصدراً لتحدّي الحكومة بشكل منتظم، وعنصراً يفرض رأيه في ديناميات البلاد السياسية.

إلى جانب الأحزاب الرسمية والجمعيات، بزغ نوع آخر من التعبئة الاجتماعية من أجل العمل السياسي في عام ٢٠٠١، وذلك في أعقاب حادث مأسوي جرى في منطقة القبائل، شرق الجزائر العاصمة. طالبت «حركة المواطن»، الاسم الذي عرفت به، من بين أمور أخرى، الاعتراف باللغة البربرية (الأمازيغية) باعتبارها لغةً وطنية رسمية، حيث إنها كانت حركة فريدة من نوعها نمت من هياكل قيادة قاعدية تقليدية تسمى «بالعرش»، التي تم إحياؤها بسبب اختلال المنافذ المؤسسية الرسمية للتعبير عن المطالب والمظالم من خلال الشعب. على الرغم من مطالبها الثقافية، كانت الحركة موجهة بمعظمها ضد نظام الحكم بأكمله، وفشله بالتعامل بشكل كافٍ مع المشاكل الاجتماعية والاقتصادية الخطيرة التي كان يعانيها الناس في أنحاء البلاد كلها. وفي وقت سبق بعشرين عاماً أدت المطالب الثقافية البربرية إلى مواجهة كبرى مع الدولة في ما أصبح يعرف باسم «الربيع البربري»[7].

## ٢ – الإسلام السياسي: من مدرجات السياسة إلى ميدان العنف وعودة إلى السياسة مرة أخرى

كانت الحركات الإسلامية وأحزابها، التي سرعان ما أصبحت الجامع والفاصل في الشؤون الشعبية في أواخر الثمانينيات، على رأس أول انتخابات بلدية متعددة الأحزاب في عام ١٩٩٠، وكانت على وشك الفوز بأغلبية ساحقة في انتخابات ١٩٩١ البرلمانية. ومع ذلك، منع التدخل العسكري باتخاذ سلسلة من الإجراءات: إلغاء اقتراع جولة الإعادة، ومن ثم التصويت بأكملها؛ إجبار الرئيس (الشاذلي بن جديد) على الاستقالة؛ حظر

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(٧) بدأ الربيع البربري في ١٠ آذار/مارس ١٩٨٠ عندما منع البوليس الكاتب المعروف مولود معمري من إلقاء محاضرة حول الشعر البربري القديم بجامعة تيزي أوزو، المدينة الرئيسة في منطقة القبائل البربرية بشرق الجزائر. هذا العمل تبعه إضراب طلابي ومظاهرات وقمع استمر حتى حزيران/ يونيو.

الحزب الفائز، الجبهة الإسلامية للإنقاذ (FIS)؛ وإقامة قيادة جماعية موقتة للبلاد بين عامي١٩٩٢ و١٩٩٥، وردّ الإسلاميون من خلال تشكيل مجموعات مسلّحة عدة شنت حرباً شاملة ضد الدولة، وكل من اعتبرته عدوّاً في المجتمع.

تورّطت الجماعات الإسلامية المتطرفة والدولة في شَرَك صراع قاتل معقّد جداً. ارتكبت التنظيمات المسلحة الجديدة، وعلى رأسها الجماعة الإسلامية المسلحة (GIA)، والحركة الإسلامية المسلحة (MIA)، وجيش الخلاص الإسلامي (AIS) الجناح المسلح لجبهة الإنقاذ الإسلامية، والجماعة السلفية للدعوة والقتال (GSPC)، ارتكبت سلسلة من جرائم القتل لم تستهدف الجيش والشرطة فحسب، بل كان كثير من الضحايا من المدنيين. كان من بين هؤلاء المدنيين المواطنون البسطاء الذين رفضوا مساعدتهم، أو اشتبهوا في التعاون مع الدولة، والصحفيون والأساتذة والشعراء والأطباء وزعماء أحزاب المعارضة والأجانب. قتل نحو ٢٠٠ ألف شخص من قبل المتمردين والدولة بين عامي ١٩٩٢ و١٩٩٩، وأصيب أكثر من ذلك، ونزح ١,٥ مليون شخص من بؤر التمرد العديدة⁽⁸⁾. دمّر العنف الإسلامي الكثير من البنى التحتية غير النفطية الاقتصادية والاجتماعية، وألقوا المزيد من الناس إلى براثن الفقر، بل عزلوا البلاد أيضاً في الساحة الدولية، ومع ذلك قلل بشكل كبير أيضاً من الدعم الشعبي الذي كانت تتمتع به الحركات الدينية. تم ترويض التمرد الإسلامي مع نهاية التسعينيات بفضل عوامل عدة، بما في ذلك: «العسكرية (زيادة عدد قوات الأمن بـ ٨٠ ألف من الدرك و٢٠٠ ألف من الميليشيا)، السياسية (الوفاق المدني [برنامج عفو])، والاجتماعية (فقدان الدعم الشعبي لحرب العصابات في أعقاب مذبحة المدنيين)⁽⁹⁾.

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Global IDP Project, «Algeria: More Than One Million Internally Displaced People (٨) انـظـر أيـضـاً Ignored By The International Community,» March 5, 2004. «Profile of Internal Displacement: Algeria.» A report compiled from the Global Internally Displaced Populations Database of the Norwegian Refugee Council, <www.idpproject.org>.

Luis Martinez, «La sécurité en Algérie et en Libye après le 11 septembre,» Euro (٩) MeSCoPaper, May 2003. Online at: <http://www.euromesco.net/euromesco/media/euromescopaper22.pdf>.

## ٣ - السيطرة على الاندماج السياسي للتيار الإسلامي

بينما قمعت الدول التطرف الإسلامي بقساوة، تسامحت وتعاونت مع الحركات المعتدلة (سميت كذلك لنبذها العنف)، وتم إشراكها من خلال التمثيليات المنتخبة في مؤسسات الدولة بعد استئناف الحياة البرلمانية في عام ١٩٩٧. وتم ذلك من خلال إدراج المعارضة بكل حرص في المجال السياسي. في انتخابات المجلس من ٣٨٠ عضواً في حزيران/يونيو ١٩٩٧ - أول انتخابات وطنية منذ تلك التي أجهضت عام ١٩٩٢ - فاز حزبان إسلاميان: حركة مجتمع السلم وحركة النهضة، المعروفة باسم النهضة، على التوالي بـ ٦٩ و٣٤ مقعداً، وفاز حزب كان قد تشكل حديثاً لدعم الرئيس في ذلك الوقت اليمين زروال، التجمع الوطني الديمقراطي (RND)، بـ ١١٥ مقعداً، بينما فاز حزب جبهة التحرير الوطني بـ ٦٤ مقعداً فقط. تواصلت انتخابات ١٩٩٧ المحلية والبلدية بالتوجه نفسه، وذلك بفوز المرشحين المدعومين من الحكومة بأغلبية المقاعد. في حركة مناقضة للأحداث، انتهت (حمس) بدخولها في حكومة ائتلافية مع حزب جبهة التحرير الوطني والتجمع الوطني الديمقراطي. منح الإسلاميون ٧ حقائب وزارية في الحكومة من ذلك الحين حتى انتخابات عام ٢٠١٢.

تجدر الإشارة إلى أنه قبل عام من انتخابات ١٩٩٧، تمت الموافقة على إصلاح دستوري عن طريق استفتاء شعبي، أعلن فيه أن الإسلام دين الدولة، ويحظر إنشاء أحزاب على أساس «ديني أو لغوي أو عرقي أو مهني أو جنسي أو إقليمي»، أو استخدام الدعاية الحزبية على أساس ذلك. كما أنشئت غرفة برلمانية ثانية «مجلس الأمة»، يُعيّن الرئيس ثلثها، ويُنتخَب الباقي عن طريق الاقتراع العام غير المباشر. وأخيراً، عززت التعديلات صلاحيات الرئيس على تلك المخوَّل بها كل من البرلمان ورئيس الوزراء.

تتبعت النخبة الجزائرية الحاكمة المدنية والعسكرية على حد سواء سياسة من ثلاثة مسارات تهدف إلى إعادة تأسيس شرعية وسلطة الدولة وعلى حل الأزمة من دون الإذعان لمطالب الإسلاميين:

- حملة للقضاء على التمرد الإسلامي المسلّح من خلال تعبئة جميع الأجهزة الأمنية وتسليح آلاف المدنيين.

– استئناف الحياة السياسية من خلال إجراء انتخابات تعددية رئاسية وبرلمانية.

– استئناف التحرر السياسي، لكن مع المزيد من السيطرة بطريقة انتقائية على خلاف تحرير «الانفجار الكبير» ١٩٨٩ – ١٩٩١.

عمل أربعة رؤساء ووزراؤهم منذ عام ١٩٩٢ على حل هذه الأزمة متعددة الأبعاد، وتمثل هؤلاء الرؤساء بمحمد بوضياف الذي اغتيل في حزيران/يونيو ١٩٩٢ من واحد من حرّاسه، بالكاد ٦ أشهر بعد دعوته لقيادة البلاد، علي كافي، رئيس المنظمة الوطنية لقدامى محاربي حرب التحرير، واليمين زروال، الجنرال المتقاعد الذي انتهى به الأمر بالاستقالة قبل نهاية فترة ولايته. وكان زروال أول رئيس ينتخب بتعددية حزبية في الجزائر المستقلة، حيث إنه تمكّن من بدء محادثات هدنة قبل استقالته مع واحدة من أهم المجموعات الإسلامية المسلحة، الجيش الإسلامي للإنقاذ، التي وافقت على نزع سلاحها في مقابل العفو الكامل.

تم عقد الاتفاق بحلول الرئيس الرابع – الرئيس الحالي عبد العزيز بوتفليقة الذي جاء إلى السلطة في عام ١٩٩٩، وقدم على الفور برنامج العفو المعروف باسم الوئام المدني للموافقة الشعبية عن طريق الاستفتاء. واستفاد الإسلاميون المسلحون من تنفيذ برنامج عفو آخر في وقت لاحق بخمس سنوات، بعد ذبول أعنف الجماعات، الجماعة الإسلامية المسلحة، بسبب الاقتتال الداخلي واختراق الأجهزة الأمنية الحكومية، ظلت الجماعة السلفية الجماعة المسلحة الوحيدة التي رفضت الهدنة، وتعهدت بمواصلة القتال. انضمت الجماعة السلفية في عام ٢٠٠٦ إلى تنظيم القاعدة، وغيّرت اسمها إلى تنظيم القاعدة في بلاد المغرب الإسلامي، ومددت نطاق أنشطتها إلى كامل المنطقة المغاربية ومنطقة الساحل. لا يزال التنظيم يشكل تهديداً أمنياً خطيراً على الجزائر والمنطقة، لكن ضعفت حملته بشكل كبير عن أعنف أوقاتها في أواخر التسعينيات.

يبدو أنه قد تم ترويض الإسلام السياسي في الجزائر في الوقت الراهن عن طريق قمع هامشه الراديكالي وانتهاج استراتيجية ناجحة فرّقت المعتدلين، وحيّدت بعض أنجع عناصره، مثل (حمس) والنهضة. الأسلم أن نقول إن هذه السياسة نجحت في تحقيق أهدافها بإنهاء تمرد شامل قاده الإسلاميون،

وسيطرت على الإسلام السياسي من خلال دمجه في العملية السياسية، وسمحت له بالتعبير غير العنيف، ومن دون تهديد.

بدأ الاستقرار والأمن بالرواج بحلول عام ٢٠٠٠، وأصبح عقد السنوات الرهيبة من التسعينيات مجرّد ذكرى، لكن تبقى ندوبه عميقة. عاد السلام والاستقرار النسبيّان أخيراً إلى الجزائر بعد حقبة كابوسية طويلة وعنف سياسي بلا هوادة. ومع ذلك، ظلت الدولة عاجزة عن التعامل بفاعلية مع المشاكل الاجتماعية والاقتصادية الخطيرة وعلاج وعكة سياسية دائمة بسبب فشل الإصلاحات لإحداث تغيير فاعل، ومقاومة الإصلاحات من قبل أصحاب السلطة الفعليين، وعدم قدرة المعارضة على تنسيق تحدّيها النظام.

لم تكن التغييرات المؤسسية والانتخابات التي جرت منذ منتصف التسعينيات بمثابة تغيير جوهري، فلم تتأثر طبيعة النظام الحاكم ولم تتغير هيئة السلطة بشكل كبير سواء بينها وبين النخب الحاكمة، أو بينها وبين المجتمع. وواصلت الدولة استبعاد الشخصيات السياسية الإسلامية والعلمانية التي طالبت بتغيير جذري، أو إعادة الجبهة الإسلامية للإنقاذ، أو سعت إلى إجراء مفاوضات مباشرة مع الحكومة لإيجاد حل سياسي شامل لمشاكل البلاد. ونتيجة ذلك، لم تتجاوز إدارة أزمة الجزائر متعددة الأبعاد مظهر التحرر السياسي المتحكم به.

كما أوضحنا أعلاه، دخل تيار الإسلام السياسي غير العنيف الساحة السياسية بمثابة مجموعة من الأحزاب السياسية القانونية والشرعية بدءاً من أول انتخابات رئاسية متعددة الأحزاب في عام ١٩٩٥، والانتخابات البرلمانية في عام ١٩٩٧. ومع ذلك، بعد تسجيل نتائج أولية محترمة في الانتخابات، بدأ مفعول الأحزاب الإسلامية، أساساً (حمس) بالتلاشي، حيث شهدت الانتخابات البرلمانية الثلاثة الأخيرة (٢٠٠٢ و٢٠٠٧ و٢٠١٢) تراجعاً ملحوظاً للأحزاب الإسلامية، يرجع جزئياً إلى فقدان المعارضة أهميتها وصراعات الأحزاب الداخلية. فقدت (حمس) في عام٢٠٠٧ واحداً وثلاثين مقعداً من أصل ٦٩. ومع ذلك، حصل الحزب الجديد، حركة الإصلاح الوطني (MRN)، والمعروفة بالإصلاح، المنشق عن حزب النهضة، على ٤٣ مقعداً. وبشكل عام، انخفض عدد المقاعد التي يسيطر عليها الإسلاميون من ١٠٣ مقاعد إلى ٦٠ مقعداً. في تصويت أيار/مايو ٢٠١٢ البرلماني، انخفض عدد

المقاعد البرلمانية التي تشغلها هذه الأحزاب الإسلامية أكثر ليصل إلى ٤٩ مقعداً التي حاز عليها «تحالف الجزائر الخضراء» الذي شمل مرشحين من (حمس) والإصلاح والنهضة.

اقترح عالم الاجتماع الجزائري ناصر جابي أن أحد أسباب هذا التراجع الإسلامي هو حقيقة أنه «خلافاً لما حدث في تونس أو مصر، ليس للأحزاب الجزائرية ذات التوجه الإسلامي جذور عميقة في المجتمع، وليس بوسع الناشطين من الطبقة الوسطى أن يُعبّئوا الناس على طريقة الإخوان المسلمين»[١٠]. هناك زاوية أخرى للنظر إلى تطور الإسلام السياسي في الجزائر هي «أن النظام حيّد... الأحزاب الإسلامية الرئيسة عن طريق السماح لها بالمشاركة في الانتخابات وتضمينها في الائتلاف الحاكم، الأمر الذي أغراها بثمار السلطة، فقط لتشهد تراجع دعمها الشعبي بسبب تقديم تنازلات للبقاء في البرلمان»[١١]. وفقاً للاريمونت وخميسي وتاج الدين، تم توظيف هذه الاستراتيجية كذلك على مستوى المجالس البلدية، حيث سمح للأحزاب الإسلامية بالمشاركة فيها «وعندما تفشل هذه المجالس في تحقيق نتائج إيجابية يفقد الشباب الثقة فيهم. أدت هذه العملية إلى الاستخفاف بالأحزاب الإسلامية والتشكيك بها، وهو المصير الذي لقيته الأحزاب السياسية ذات التوجه العلماني»[١٢].

## ثانياً: الأوضاع الاقتصادية وفشل الإصلاحات

كانت الجزائر مع نهاية عام ١٩٩٣ في حالة اقتصادية غير مستقرة في الوقت نفسه الذي كان فيه التمرد في أوجه، حيث لم يكن للجزائر خيار أمام تدهور الاقتصاد السريع سوى الالتزام بأوامر المؤسسات المالية الدولية

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Nasser Djabi quoted in Paul Schemm, «Algerian Islamists Fall To Govt Party In (١٠) Election,» *The Associated Press*, May 11, 2012.

Jack Brown, «Algeria's Midwinter Uproar,» Middle East Research and *Information* (١١) *Project* (MERIP), January 20, 2011. Available online at <http://www.merip.org/mero/mero 012011>.

Hamidi Khemissi, Ricardo René Larémont and Taybi Taj Eddine, «Sufism, (١٢) Salafism and state policy towards religion in Algeria: a survey of Algerian youth,» *The Journal of North African Studies*, 17:3, June 2012, p. 553.

وأعضائها الأكثر تأثيراً، وعلى رأسها فرنسا والولايات المتحدة. بعد تأخير كبير، وعلى مضض، وافقت الجزائر في عام ١٩٩٤ على برنامج التكيف الهيكلي (SAP) لصندوق النقد الدولي الذي يرعاه البنك الدولي كذلك. أدى هذا الالتزام بالحكومة إلى خفض قيمة عملة الجزائر بنسبة ٤٠ في المئة، ورفع الدعم المتبقّي للبنود الاستهلاكية الأساسية، وتضييق معاملاتها المالية وسياسات الائتمان، وإعادة تنظيم المؤسسات المالية، وتحرير تجارتها الخارجية، وخفض عجز الميزانية، وخصخصة بعض المؤسسات العامة. في غضون سنوات قليلة، تحسنت المؤشرات الاقتصادية الإجمالية للبلاد بشكل ملحوظ، وبدأت البيئة العامة تدريجياً في جذب الاهتمام المحلّي والأجنبي للاستثمار، وإن كان ذلك متواضعاً.

تم خفض نسبة التضخم من ٣٠ في المئة في عام ١٩٩٥ إلى أقل من ٣ في المئة في عام ٢٠٠٥، وسجل الميزان التجاري للدولة فائضاً، وارتفعت احتياطات العملة الصعبة من ١٫٥ مليار دولار في عام ١٩٩٣ إلى ٩٠ مليار دولار في عام ٢٠٠٧، لتصل إلى١٨٢ مليار دولار بحلول كانون الأول/ ديسمبر ٢٠١١، وتم تسديد معظم الديون الخارجية تقريباً التي بلغت٣٥ مليار دولار في وقت مبكر من الألفية الجديدة بحلول كانون الأول/ديسمبر ٢٠١١ كذلك(١٣). لم يفِ «العلاج بالصدمة» مع ذلك بوعوده لأسباب عدة، حيث كان أحد هذه الأسباب مقاومة مختلف القوى للإصلاحات المقررة، من بينها النخب السياسية التي كانت تخشى من التكلفة الاجتماعية، وأصحاب المصالح لإبقاء الوضع الراهن، بمن في ذلك أكبر اتحاد عمالي، الاتحاد العام للعمال الجزائريين، والجمعيات المدنية والمهنية، ومديرو المؤسسات العامة، وشركات الاستيراد والتصدير التي كانت تحتكر هامشاً كبيراً من الأعمال التجارية غير الرسمية، ورواد الأعمال الحرة الذين استفادوا من نزعة الدولة الحمائية والإعانات ومغالاة العملة. تم تسريح أكثر من ٥٠٠ ألف عامل بحلول عام ١٩٩٨ في أعقاب إعادة هيكلة أو إغلاق المؤسسات العامة (تم حل ٨١٥ مؤسسة، وكان على ما نجا من الوحدات الاقتصادية تسريح ٦٠ في

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(١٣) في كانون الأول/ديسمبر ٢٠١١ كان لدى الجزائر ٤٫٤ بليون دولار فقط كما أعلن محافظ البنك المركزي الجزائري في شباط/فبراير٢٠١٢، انظر: «Les réserves de changes atteignent 182,22 milliards de dollars en 2011,» Algérie Presse Service, February 23, 2012.

المئة من عمالها)[١٤]. ارتفع معدل البطالة إلى ٣٥ في المئة في التسعينيات قبل أن يتراجع إلى ١٧,٧ في المئة في عام ٢٠٠٤ و١١ في المئة في عام ٢٠١١، وزاد عدد الأشخاص الذين يعيشون تحت خط الفقر ليصل إلى ٢٣ في المئة في عام ٢٠٠٦[١٥]، قبل أن يتراجع إلى ١٨,٩٥ في المئة في عام ٢٠٠٨، وتفاقم عدم المساواة الاجتماعية بشكل ملحوظ، كما هو مبين في تقرير عن الفقر صادر عن الأجهزة الأمنية للبلاد، الذي يوضح أن أقل من ٢٠ في المئة من السكان يسيطرون على أكثر من٥٠ في المئة من ثروة البلاد[١٦].

تتمثل أكبر مفارقة في الجزائر، كما هو مبيّن أعلاه، في تحسن مكانة البلاد المالية خلال العقد الأخير من جهة، لكن تفاقمت الظروف الاجتماعية والاقتصادية لمعظم مواطنيها خلال الفترة الزمنية نفسها من جهة أخرى. تعود أسباب ذلك إلى عدم وجود استراتيجية تنموية متماسكة، وعدم مناسبة تسيير قطاع النفط الذي فشل في تحفيز القطاع غير الهيدروكربوني على الإنتاج الاقتصادي. وعلاوة على ذلك، تعتمد الجزائر على تصدير النفط والغاز بشكل كبير، ما يجعلها عرضة لتقلبات أسعارها الدولية وغيرها من الظروف التي يمكن أن تؤثر في إيراداتها تأثيراً كبيراً.

على غرار الدول الريعية الأخرى، «تظهر الدولة الجزائرية قوية عندما يرتفع الإيجار، لكن يمكن أن تضعف بسرعة بمجرد انخفاض الإيرادات، ويضر ذلك بقدرتها... على تلبية الاستحقاقات الاجتماعية المتنامية.»[١٧] عاشت الجزائر هذا السيناريو في نهاية الثمانينيات وبداية التسعينيات، ولا تزال رهينة عقلية إيجار النفط إلى حدّ الساعة، فهي غير قادرة على تصميم وتنفيذ استراتيجية مُجدية طويلة الأمد للتنميتين السياسية والاقتصادية. كان أهم رد للحكومة على الاضطرابات الاجتماعية في العقد الماضي هو ضخ كمية كبيرة

*Rapport Préliminaire sur Les Effets Economiques et Sociaux du Programme* (١٤) *d'Ajustement Structurel*, Conseil National Economique et Social (CNES), (Algiers: CNES, November, 1998).

«Algeria,» CIA World Factbook, May 2012. (١٥)

«Pauvreté en Algérie: Rapport Alarmant Des Services De Sécurité,» *Le Soir* (١٦) *d'Algerie*, May 11, 2006.

Richard M. Auty, «Third time Lucky for Algeria? Integrating an industrializing oil- (١٧) rich country into the global economy», Resources Policy 29 (2003), p.38. on-line at <www.elsevier.com/locate/resourpol>.

من النقود في الاقتصاد على شكل استثمارات في البنى التحتية، وهو إجراء لا يولّد دخلاً، ولا فرص عمل على المدى الطويل. تم استثمار نحو ٥٠٠ مليار دولار بين عامي ٢٠٠٠ و٢٠١١ في المقام الأول في بناء الطرق السريعة وبناء المساكن الجديدة لأصحاب الدخل المنخفض والزراعة. ويُخشى مع ذلك أن هذا الضخ الهائل لرأس المال في الاقتصاد قد لا يكون له الأثر المرغوب فيه لأن الجزء الأكبر من المال لا يستخدم في الإنتاج، ولا في خلق فرص العمل.(١٨) في السنوات الأخيرة، تم توجيه بعض الاستثمارات العامة إلى صناعة الإسمنت والأسمدة والاتصالات الهاتفية والسياحة، وخصصت الأموال والقروض الصغيرة لمساعدة الشباب في العثور على وظائف أو إنشاء أعمال خاصة بهم لتمكينهم من ريادة الأعمال الحرة. مع ذلك، فشلت هذه الجهود في تلبية الحاجة إلى توفير ٣٠٠ ألف منصب شغل جديد سنوياً، وذلك من أجل استيعاب المطالب الحالية والمستقبلية. يقدر معدل البطالة الرسمي حوالى ١٠ في المئة، لكن يعتبر ٢٥ في المئة من العاطلين عن العمل من الشباب، وكثير منهم من خريجي الجامعات.

كان «الاقتصاد الموازي» عائقاً مهماً في إجراء إصلاحات اقتصادية سليمة، حيث إنه كان يمثل حوالى ٤٠ في المئة من الأنشطة غير الهيدروكربونية، وكان يفلت من مراقبة الدولة ويتخطّى الضرائب. بعض الشخصيات في المكاتب العامة والبيروقراطية، وكذلك بعض الضباط العسكريين المتقاعدين أصحاب المصالح التجارية الكبرى، والذين كانت لهم مصالح خاصة في القطاع غير الرسمي لم يرحبوا بالشفافية والمساءلة في المعاملات المالية التي تتضمنها الإصلاحات والخصخصة. وتثبط الأنظمة الاقتصادية الحالية والمؤسسات والممارسات الإصلاحات العامة والاستثمارات الخاصة، وتمنع نمو قطاع خاص رسمي للإنتاج، في حين أنها تشجع على السلوك المفترس الذي يزدهر في بيئة النظام الرسمي القائم على الإيجار والدعم. في هذا السياق، انتشر الفساد على مستويات عالية من الشركات العامة والبيروقراطية في السنوات الأخيرة، وأصبح مشكلةً تُعرقل مسار الاستثمارات العامة وتطعن بشرعية الدولة. كان مشروع بناء الطريق السيّارة

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(١٨) Florence Beaugé, «L'Algérie va lancer un 'plan Marshall' pour doper son économie,» Le Monde, June 24, 2005.

شرق – غرب، وشركة النفط والغاز الوطنية (سوناطراك) متورطين في قضايا فساد كبيرة مؤخراً، وتم إقالة مديرين من مستوى عالٍ وحتى وزراء في الحكومة بسبب هذه الفضائح.

## ثالثاً: الجزائر و«الربيع العربي»

عشية الاضطرابات الاجتماعية في عام ٢٠١١ في العالم العربي، كانت الجزائر تتمتع أخيراً بعودة الاستقرار السياسي والأمني نسبياً، وبعض الازدهار الاقتصادي، نتيجة زيادة عائدات النفط والغاز، بعد فترة طويلة من الاضطراب وعدم الاستقرار. ومع ذلك، في عمق هذا الاستقرار والازدهار السطحيين كان هناك – ولا يزال – شعور بالضيق الاجتماعي والاقتصادي والسياسي بسبب ارتفاع معدلات البطالة بين الشباب، وزيادة التضخم، وعدم استجابة الحكومة لمطالب الناس الملحّة، وركود عملية التحرر السياسي، وشيخوخة قيادة البلاد العليا. وكان الوضع الاجتماعي في الجزائر متوتراً بالفعل عندما بدأت الاضطراب في تونس في كانون الأول/ديسمبر ٢٠١١، حيث إن «الظروف الاجتماعية والاقتصادية الوخيمة في البلاد، إلى جانب الشلل الحكومي، وذلك أساساً بسبب مرض الرئيس عبد العزيز بوتفليقة، جعلت من الجزائر أفضل المرشحين للثورة»[١٩].

## ١ – أعمال شغب عام كانون الثاني/يناير ٢٠١١: محدودة وقصيرة وغير سياسية

اندلعت أعمال الشغب في ٣ كانون الثاني/يناير ٢٠١١ في الجزائر العاصمة والمدن الرئيسة الأخرى في أعقاب شائعات بأن أسعار المواد الغذائية الأساسية (السميد والسكر وزيت الطبخ) كانت على وشك الارتفاع مرة أخرى بسبب اللوائح الجديدة التي كانت تهدف إلى كبح جماح السوق غير الرسمية. كانت أعمال الشغب عفوية وليس لديها أي شعارات سياسية. كان شعارها الوحيد مناهضة ارتفاع تكاليف المعيشة بسبب الزيادات في السوق العالمية للمواد الغذائية (تعدّ الجزائر من أكبر مستوردي المواد الغذائية)، وتقلص

Yahia H. Zoubir and Ahmed Aghrout, «Algeria's Path to Reform: Authentic (١٩) Change?,» Middle East Policy, Vol. XIX, No. 2, Summer 2012, p. 66.

الدعم الحكومي، وانخفاض الحد الأدنى للأجور الراكدة. كان مثيرو الشغب غاضبون أيضاً من الدولة بسبب نقص حادّ في المساكن بأسعار معقولة، وفشل النظامين التعليمي والصحي، وتفشّي الفساد والمحسوبية والمحاباة في البيروقراطية والشركات العامة. وشملت مطالبهم تحسين الظروف المعيشية، وانخفاض أسعار المواد الغذائية، وتوفير فرص العمل والاحترام. ومع ذلك، «لم يضفِ قط الطابع السياسي على... أعمال الشغب، ولم يتحول الغوغائيون إلى محتجين. ولم تكن هناك مسيرات ولا شعارات مشتركة ولا مطالب منسَّقة»[٢٠].

وجد كثيرون من الشباب الجزائري أنفسهم محاصرين في وضع يائس أمام عدم قدرة سوق العمل على استيعابهم وتشديد قوانين الهجرة في أوروبا وأمريكا الشمالية. لم تكن لديهم ثقة تذكر في السياسة الرسمية، ولا الأحزاب السياسية، الذين، بالنسبة إليهم، لا يخدمون سوى مقرّبيهم. ولانعدام وسائل التعبير السلمي عن مظاليمهم والحصول على ردّ، فإنهم لجأوا إلى عنف الشارع. لم تكن أعمال شغب كانون الثاني/يناير ٢٠١١ سابقة السنوات الأخيرة، بل أصبح الشغب حدثاً عادياً لا يكاد يمر يوم واحد من دون أن تشهد منطقة من البلاد ثَوَرانه. في الوقت الحاضر، كلما فشلت السلطات المحلية أو الدولة في الاستجابة إلى إحدى القضايا الملحّة، ينزل الناس إلى الشوارع، ويستهدفون المباني الحكومية، ويعرقلون حركة المرور على الطرق الرئيسة، وينظّمون اعتصامات، ويدخلون في إضراب عن الطعام.

لم تقتصر أعمال الشغب في كانون الثاني/يناير ٢٠١١ على منطقة محدّدة، بل وقعت في وقت واحد في مدن عدة في أنحاء البلاد، أثارتها شائعات ارتفاع الأسعار الوشيك مستوحية الاحتجاجات الجماهيرية في تونس. ومع ذلك، على النقيض من الاحتجاجات التونسية والمصرية، لم يحصل الشباب الجزائري على دعم النقابات العمالية والأحزاب السياسية والجمعيات المدنية. لم تستمر أعمال الشغب الأخيرة لأكثر من ٤ أيام، ولم تقدم أي مطالب سياسية، بل انتهت بمجرد أن أعلنت الحكومة أنها لن تتسامح مع أي ارتفاع للأسعار، وأنها ستفعل ما يلزم لترقى إلى مستوى هذا الوعد. هذا

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(٢٠) Jack Brown, «Algeria's Midwinter Uproar,» *Middle East Research and Information Project* (MERIP), January 20, 2011. Online at: <http://www.merip.org/mero/mero012011>.

وشمل الوعد إدراج لوائح جديدة للسوق كانت وشيكة، منها «إعفاءات موقتة واستثنائية على رسوم الاستيراد وضريبة القيمة المضافة والضريبة على الشركات بالنسبة إلى السلع الأساسية اليومية»[21].

قطعت هذه التدابير الفتيل قبل وصول شرارة أعمال الشغب، لكنها لم تحلّ المشاكل الأساسية، ودُعي ثلاثمئة من الشباب في ١٩ كانون الثاني/يناير ٢٠١١ إلى جلسة البرلمان، حيث سمح لهم بحرية التعبير عن شكاواهم ورغباتهم. من المدهش أن قضية أسعار المواد الغذائية كانت العنصر الأخير في قائمتهم، على الرغم من أن كثيراً من الناس ينفق بين ٤٠ و٥٥ في المئة من دخلهم على الغذاء. بدلاً من ذلك، كانت شكاواهم الرئيسة تتعلق بفرص العمل والسكن والتهميش في النظم السياسية والاقتصادية، والازدراء (الحقرة) التي ينتهجها البيروقراطيون وأعوان أمن الدولة تجاههم.

وعد الرئيس بوتفليقة في خطابه في ٣٠ كانون الثاني/يناير، وأول مرة بعد شهر تقريباً من أعمال شغب في أوائل كانون الثاني/يناير، بزيادة فرص عمل جديدة ورفع حالة الطوارئ التي دامت ١٩ عاماً، وبمزيد من الحريات السياسية. استقبل خطابه بسخرية الجمهور بسبب عدم وفائه بوعود مماثلة سابقاً، أو عدوله عنها، أو عدم معالجته المشاكل الأساسية التي هي في الواقع جزء لا يتجزأ من النظم السياسية والاقتصادية بأكملها. وعلاوة على ذلك، فإن رفع حالة الطوارئ لا يعني نهاية تضييق الحريات التعسفي، حيث لا تزال كثير من اللوائح المقيّدة في حيّز التنفيذ.

## ٢ – الاحتجاجات السياسية في عام ٢٠١٢: محدودة ومكبوتة وسريعة الزوال

انطلقت أخيراً حركة احتجاج سياسي في الجزائر العاصمة يوم ١٢ شباط/فبراير، وذلك بعد أكثر من شهر من نشوب أعمال الشغب. كان ذلك مؤشراً إلى مدى صعوبة تعبئة الجماهير للعمل السياسي الشامل المتضافر ضد نظام الحكم بأكمله. ومع ذلك، لم يدم الاحتجاج الذي بدأ في شباط/فبراير

(٢١) «BTI 2012 Algeria Country Report,» Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index

(BTI) Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012, p. 23. Available online at: < http://www.bti-proje

ct.de/fileadmin/Inhalte/reports/2012/pdf/BTI 2012 Algeria.pdf > .

٢٠١٢ طويلاً لأسباب عدة، كما سيتم شرح ذلك أدناه. كان على رأسه التنسيقية الوطنية للتغيير والديمقراطية المعروفة باختصارها الفرنسي CNCD، وهي منظمة أُنشئت في ٢١ كانون الثاني/يناير من الأحزاب السياسية الصغيرة، الرابطة الوطنية للدفاع عن حقوق الإنسان، والرابطة الوطنية لعائلات الأشخاص المفقودين (الذين «اختفوا» خلال الحرب الداخلية من التسعينيات)، وجمعية العاطلين عن العمل، ومجموعات أخرى كثيرة. قاد حركة الاحتجاج التجمع من أجل الديمقراطية والثقافة (RCD)، وهو حزب معارضة يتمتع بدائرة دعم ضيقة من الأشخاص الذين يتحدثون اللغة الأمازيغية في الجزائر العاصمة ومنطقة القبائل القريبة. طالبت الحركة بالديمقراطية، وإنهاء حالة الطوارئ، وتحرير المجالين السياسي والإعلامي، وإطلاق سراح الأشخاص الذين قبض عليهم خلال أعمال الشغب من كانون الثاني/يناير ٢٠١١.

دعا (CNCD) إلى مسيرة حاشدة في الجزائر العاصمة يوم ١٢ شباط/ فبراير ضد النظام الحاكم بأكمله، وأولئك الذين يعرفون عند معظم الجزائريين باسم (le pouvoir). مع ذلك، منعت الحكومة حدوث ذلك باستخدام عدد هائل من الشرطة لتفريق التجمعات، وعن طريق إغلاق الشوارع وإقامة نقاط التفتيش، ووقف خدمات الحافلات والقطارات كلها، ومنع الولوج إلى الفيسبوك. كانت هناك محاولات أخرى عديدة لتنظيم مسيرات ومظاهرات، لكن قلت رغبة الناس في الانضمام إليها. كانت هناك عدة أسباب تفسر عدم قدرة المعارضة السياسية على شن وإدامة مظاهرات شعبية ضد الأوضاع السياسية والاقتصادية والاجتماعية المذكورة أعلاه. يعود السبب **الأول**، وهذا ما يستشهد به كثيرون، إلى أن صدمة العشرية السوداء من التسعينيات لا تزال حية في ذاكرة الناس، وجراحها لم تلتئم بعد، ونتيجة ذلك، فإن معظم الناس لم يكونوا على استعداد لخوض المعركة، وإن كانت سلمية كان يحتمل أن تتحول إلى أعمال عنف. وهناك سبب **ثانٍ** هو اعتقاد الناس أن قوات الأمن الجزائرية لن تتردد، كما كان الحال في عام ١٩٨٨ والتسعينيات، في استخدام وسائل عنيفة للسيطرة على أي حركة شعبية تهدد الاستقرار. والسبب **الثالث**، حقيقة معروفة تتمثل في أن المؤسسات الأكثر نفوذاً في الجزائر هي خدمات الأمن العسكري المعروفة باسم (DRS)، فليست قيادة المدنيين من كان لديها السلطة الاسمية فقط.

يستلزم النظام السياسي وجود إما نعمة الجيش (كما كان الحال في تونس في عام ٢٠١١)، أو الاستعداد للمخاطرة ومجابهة القمع القاسي (كما

كان الحال خلال تسعينيات الجزائر أو سوريا ٢٠١١ – ٢٠١٢). السبب **الرابع**، هو عدم قدرة المعارضة على تشكيل تحالف واسع ومستديم بإمكانه تحريض حركة جماهيرية للاحتجاج أو الثورة ضد النظام الحاكم. أصبح قادة النظام بارعين جداً خلال العقدين الأخيرين في تحييد المعارضة من خلال اختراقها أو التلاعب بها أو مجرد إقصائها، الأمر الذي يجعل المنشقّين السياسيين يجدون صعوبة بالغة في التنظيم والعمل في انسجام تام في خضمّه. كان هناك سبب آخر لفشل احتجاج شباط/فبراير هو – كما كان الحال مع أعمال الشغب في كانون الثاني/يناير – أنها لم تعتمد من قبل الاتحاد العام للعمال الجزائريين، والأحزاب السياسية والنقابات المهنية المهمة.

لم تكن التنسيقية الوطنية للتغيير والديمقراطية، واضحة في أهدافها التي لم تتجاوز الشجب الغامض للنظام والمطالبة بالديمقراطية؛ كما إن احتجاجات CNCD لم تستهدف رئيس الدولة، كما حدث في ذلك الوقت في تونس ومصر، ولاحقاً في اليمن وليبيا وسوريا، لكن كانت تستهدف ما عرف بـ le pouvoir، وهم أصحاب السلطة الحقيقيون وغير المنتخبين في الجزائر. وعلاوة على ذلك، تم الطعن في شرعية التنسيقية الوطنية وإخماد جاذبيتها بسبب سمعة سعيد سعدي، رئيس حزب التجمع، زعيم المعارضة المحيد في عام ١٩٩٢، الذي عرف بدعمه لإلغاء أول انتخابات برلمانية تعددية ولقمع الإسلاميين الذين كانوا على وشك الفوز بها. بعد أسابيع قليلة من المحاولة، من دون جدوى، لتجنيد المزيد من المحتجين وكسر حصار الشرطة الموجودة بشكل كبير في العاصمة على حد سواء، تلاشت حركة الاحتجاج التي قادتها (CNCD) ولم يتم الاستعاضة عنها منذ ذلك الحين.

مع ذلك، تواصلت أشكال أخرى من الاحتجاجات وأعمال الشغب المحلية حول قضايا محدودة – وزادت شدتها بعض الأحيان – في أنحاء البلاد كلها بين عامي ٢٠١١ و٢٠١٢، ومسّت هذه الأعمال بلدات وقرى عدة، والعديد من القطاعات المهنية. وأثرت إضرابات عدة بقيادة النقابات المستقلة (أي غير المنتسبة لـ (UGTA) على التعليم والصحة والخدمة المدنية وقطاعات الممارسة القانونية، وكذلك العديد من الصناعات (الخاصة والعامة والمختلطة). وشملت مطالب المضربين برفع الأجور لمواكبة التضخم أو التعادل مع الرواتب في القطاع العام الذي استفاد مؤخراً من زيادات الأجور بنسب من ٢٥ في المئة إلى ٥٠ في المئة (على سبيل المثال، زيادة رواتب

الشرطة في ربيع ٢٠١١)، وبتحسين ظروف العمل، وتحسين الصحة وتعويضات التقاعد.

انتشر منذ عهد قريب شكل آخر من أشكال الاحتجاج: الانتحار، وبخاصة عن طريق الحرق، أصبحت للأسف ظاهرة متكررة في الفترة الممتدة بين عامي ٢٠١١ و٢٠١٢، وذلك محاكاة لتضحية الرجل من بلدة سيدي بوزيد التونسية بنفسه حرقاً، حيث سجل ذلك عموماً بداية «الربيع العربي» في كانون الأول/ديسمبر عام ٢٠١٠. وعلى الرغم من زيادة معدلات الانتحار حرقاً ومحاولاته لم يكن ذلك محل اهتمام للعامة، ولم يثر قلق المسؤولين الحكوميين. الشكل النهائي للاحتجاجات، الذي يجدر ذكره، هو تنامي ظاهرة محاولات الهجرة غير الشرعية لأوروبا عن طريق البحر والمعروف باسم الحرقة. يسفر هذا الشكل الخطير من الهروب عن العديد من الوفيات، ولا تزال حتى الآن بديلاً جذاباً لكثير من الناس الذين فقدوا الأمل في عيش حياة كريمة.

## ٣ – إصلاحات لمراوغة ربيع الاضطرابات في المنطقة

شعوراً بوهج الضغط الاجتماعي الناتج من أعمال الاحتجاج الجماعية والفردية، وخوفاً من انتقال عدوى الاضطرابات الشعبية في المنطقة، كانت الحكومة الجزائرية تحاول شراء السلام والاستقرار من خلال التعهد بإصلاحات اقتصادية وسياسية. إذ على الصعيد الاقتصادي، أعلنت جولة جديدة من الاستثمارات العامة في القطاعات الاجتماعية والاقتصادية. في ربيع عام ٢٠١١، أعلن أنه سيتم صبّ ٢٨٠ مليون دولار أمريكي في الاقتصاد في محاولة لخلق فرص عمل جديدة في القطاعات الصناعية والخدمية. دعمت هذه الأموال برامج القروض الصغيرة، وتمويل تربّصات الشباب والأشغال العامة التي تولد وظائف، وزيادة رواتب العاملين في القطاع العام. «تشتري الحكومة بشكل منتظم السخط الاجتماعي من خلال توفير الرعاية الاجتماعية النسبية من مكاسب صادرات النفط والغاز الاستثنائية. في الوقت الذي يتيح فيه هذا النهج مهلة سياسية للحكومة على المدى القصير، فإنه يتخطى الحاجة إلى معالجة العديد من نقاط الضعف في الاقتصاد الجزائري والنظام السياسي بجدية»[٢٢].

على الجبهة السياسية، أعلن الرئيس بوتفليقة في ١٥ نيسان/أبريل ٢٠١١

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(٢٢)    «BTI 2012 Algeria Country Report,» op. cit., p. 64.

خطة لسلسلة من الإصلاحات التي من شأنها أن تؤثر، من بين أمور أخرى، في الدستور نفسه، والنظام الانتخابي والتوازن بين الجنسين في المؤسسات السياسية، ووسائل الإعلام[٢٣]. في البداية، أنشأ في أيار/مايو لجنة وطنية للتشاور حول الإصلاحات السياسية (CNCRP)[٢٤] التي، بعد استشارة الأفراد والمنظمات الرئيسة، تقدم توصيات إصلاحية للرئيس والبرلمان. تخطت اللجنة أي مناقشة شعبية حول طبيعة الإصلاحات، وكانت تنقصها المصداقية لانتقاء الأفراد الذين ترغب في التشاور معهم، لكنها مع ذلك سلمت التوصيات في حزيران/يونيو ٢٠١١ التي وافقت عليها في وقت لاحق الحكومة والبرلمان. لم ترق هذه التوصيات إلى الكثير من حيث التغيير الديمقراطي، حيث كان من المفترض أن تعكس ذلك.

عملاً بتوصيات الإصلاح، تم المصادقة على ٢١ حزباً جديداً، الشأن الذي ميّع المعارضة السياسية أكثر، وهمّش التشكيلات الإسلامية. جلب نظام الحصص الجديد الذي يدعم وجود المرأة في القوائم الانتخابية والبرلمان ١٤٥ من عضوات البرلمان، وهو ما يمثل حوالى ٣١ في المئة من ٤٦٢ من نواب المجلس الوطني، بعد أن كانت ٧ في المئة فقط[٢٥]. يُعَدّ هذا تغييراً هائلاً في تمثيل المرأة في البرلمان، لكن يتساءل المرء كيف سيؤثر هذا في المستوى العام لمشاركة المرأة في الحياة السياسية التي كانت عموماً منخفضة للغاية. أما بالنسبة إلى الإصلاح الدستوري، فرفضت الحكومة دعوة المعارضة لإنشاء جمعية تأسيسية من شأنها صياغة النص الإصلاحي؛ بدلاً من ذلك، قيل إنه سيتم مناقشة مجموعة من التغييرات والتصويت عليها من البرلمان الجديد. ويشاع أن من بين الإصلاحات هناك احتمال العودة إلى حدود الولاية الرئاسية التي ألغيت في عام ٢٠٠٩[٢٦]. وعموماً، «فإن الإصلاحات التي

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(٢٣) «Bouteflika annonce des réformes politiques en Algérie,» L'Express.fr, April 15, 2011. Online at: <http://www.lexpress.fr>. Consulted on June 3, 2012.

(٢٤) ترأس اللجنة عبد القادر بن صالح، رئيس مجلس الشعب، الغرفة العليا بالبرلمان، ونائباه الجنرال المتقاعد محمد تواتي ومحمد علي بوغازي، وهما مستشاران مقربان للرئيس بوتفليقة.

(٢٥) زادت إعداد مقاعد الغرفة الثانية للبرلمان إلى ٤٦٢ في عام ٢٠١٢.

(٢٦) في ٢٠٠٩ ألغى تعديل دستوري تحديد الرئاسة بفترتين كلّ منها خمس سنوات من أجل تحقيق رغبة الرئيس بوتفليقة في الحصول على فترة ثالثة. تم إعادة انتخابه لفترة ثالثة في تلك السنة.

سُنّت، والتي نوقشت «لا تشكل أي انفراج حقيقي، وليس من المرجح أن تتغير الطبيعة الأساسية للنظام السياسي الذي وضع قبل ٥٠ عاماً. يبدو أن النظام استنسخ المخطط الذي وضعه بعد أحداث الشغب في تشرين الأول/ أكتوبر ١٩٨٨»(٢٧).

## ٤ - انتخابات عام ٢٠١٢ البرلمانية ومسؤولية العطالة

في ١٠ أيار/مايو ٢٠١٢، أجريت الانتخابات البرلمانية في الجزائر في مناخ اجتماعي واقتصادي متوتر للغاية، يزيد منه الشعور بالضيق السياسي، وقاطع الانتخابات الأغلبية العظمى من الناخبين المؤهلين، حيث بلغت نسبة المشاركة الرسمية ٤٣,١٤ . لكن معظم المراقبين يتفقون على أن، في الواقع، المشاركة كانت أقل من ذلك، مقدّرة بين ٢٠ و٣٠ في المئة. ويعتقد أن معظم الذين صوتوا كانوا أعضاء في الأحزاب المشاركة، وموظفي الخدمة المدنية والجيش والشرطة، والعملاء من أصحاب السلطة، والناس الذين هم بحاجة إلى أن ينظر إليهم بشكل جيد من قبل النظام الحاكم(٢٨). لم تسعد نتائج الانتخابات التي سبقتها بعض الإصلاحات وإضفاء الصفة القانونية على ٢١ حزباً جديداً، معظم المتنافسين، في حين أن المجتمع كان غير مبال. وكان عدم وجود الاهتمام الشعبي بالانتخابات البرلمانية الأسوأ منذ التحرر السياسي الذي بدأ في عام ١٩٨٩.

لم يكن الناس يعتقدون أنه من المفيد أن يصوّتوا لاختيار البرلمان الذي لم يكن يستجيب لمطالبهم، عاجزاً أمام مراكز السلطة والقوة الأخرى، والذي يشغله أفراد تشغلهم مصالحهم الشخصية أكثر من مشاغل المجتمع. قبل التصويت، قدم الرئيس بوتفليقة وقادة جبهة التحرير الوطني والتجمع الوطني الديمقراطي(٢٩) هذه الانتخابات على شكل استفتاء على الأمن والاستقرار في

Yahia H. Zoubir and Ahmed Aghrout, «Algeria's Path to Reform...» op. cit., p. (٢٧) 66.

Dominique Lagarde, «Algérie: des élections et des questions,» L'Express.fr, April (٢٨) 15, 2011. Online at: < http://www.lexpress.fr >. Consulted on June 3, 2012.

(٢٩) برئاسة أحمد أويحيى الذي تولى رئاسة الوزارة ثلاث مرات، أما الجبهة فهي برئاسة عبد العزيز بلخادم الذي كان رئيساً للوزراء بين عامي ٢٠٠٦ و٢٠٠٨، وقد واجهت قيادته تحدي بعد انتخابات ٢٠١٢.

البلاد في ضوء ما يجري في ليبيا، ومنطقة الساحل (وبخاصة الأزمة في مالي)، ومصر واليمن وسوريا. وأعرب رئيس الوزراء أحمد أو يحيى صراحة عن استيائه من «الربيع العربي» الذي عرض على أنه مؤامرة أجنبية ضد الدول العربية. في أعقاب نزاع داخلي على القيادة، أصبحت جبهة التحرير الوطني منقسمة حول جدوى أمينها العام، عبد العزيز بلخادم[30]. قررت (حمس) قبل ثلاثة أشهر من التصويت، الانسحاب من الائتلاف الحكومي المؤيد والانضمام إلى المعارضة، بأمل الفوز على غرار النهضة في تونس، والإخوان المسلمين في مصر، وحتى حزب العدالة والتنمية في المغرب. ومع ذلك، أثبت ذلك أنها كانت حركت قاتلة للحزب تقريباً، وهذا ما تشير إليه نتائجه الضعيفة في انتخابات عام ٢٠١٢.

فاجأت نتائج انتخابات عام ٢٠١٢ أكثر من شخص واحد، وساهمت بتعميق الشعور بالضيق السياسي. بدلاً من وضع الجزائر على الطريق الصحيحة لإجراء تغييرات مفيدة، كما كان بعض الناس يأملون، شكلت هذه الانتخابات دليلاً واضحاً على نية النظام في تجنّب ما يُنظَر إليها على أنها مطبّات «الربيع العربي». بخزائن تعجّ بدخل النفط والغاز، فضلت الجزائر الوضع الراهن باعتباره ضامناً للاستقرار وللتصدي لموجة عارمة من الانتصارات الانتخابية للإسلاميين في المنطقة. حصل حزب جبهة التحرير الوطني على أقوى النتائج منذ سقوطه في انتخابات عام ١٩٩١ و١٩٩٧ المجهضتين، حيث فاز بـ ٢٠٨ مقاعد من أصل ٤٦٢ في التصويت عام ٢٠١٢، في حين أن الـ (RND) تلقّى ٦٨ مقعداً، بعد أن كانت ٦١[31].

وفقاً لتعليق صحافي «ساعد انخفاض إقبال الناخبين (٤٣,١٤ في المئة) على فوز جبهة التحرير الوطني. كان من المحتمل أن يتوجه مساندوها التقليديون – كبار السن، الجيش، وموظفو الخدمة العامة – إلى صناديق الاقتراع والتصويت، في حين بقي أولئك الذين كان بمقدورهم مواجهتها في

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(٣٠) الانقسامات الداخلية في صفوفها ليست جديدة، بل ترجع إلى الأيام التي كان فيها علي بنفليس رئيساً للوزراء، حيث تحدى بوتفليقة في انتخابات ٢٠٠٤، وحاول السيطرة على قيادة الجبهة، وأفلح فقط في تعميق انقساماتها.

(٣١) النتائج التي نشرتها الحكومة بعد التصويت في منتصف أيار/مايو تم تعديلها بعد أكثر من ٦٠ اعتراضاً قدمتها الأحزاب المشاركة والمرشحون الأفراد. النتائج المعدلة كما في الجدول الرقم (٥-١).

بيوتهم»(٣٢). بعد الهزائم الأولية لها في انتخابات ١٩٩١ و١٩٩٧، وفوزها بـ ١٥ و٦٩ مقعداً على التوالي، انتعشت جبهة التحرير الوطني في عام ٢٠٠٢ بـ ١٩٩ مقعداً. في انتخابات ٢٠٠٧، خسرت جبهة التحرير الوطني والتجمع الوطني الديمقراطي ٤٩ مقعداً من أصل ٢٤٦ مجتمعة – بسبب خسائر جبهة التحرير الوطني (من ١٩٩ إلى ١٣٦ مقعداً) – لكنهما ظلتا التشكيلتين الرئيستين.

بين عامي ٢٠٠٢ و٢٠٠٧، اكتملت دائرة العملية بعودة حزب جبهة التحرير الوطني إلى مركز المهيمن وتقديم الدعم الكامل إلى الرئيس بوتفليقة. وتعزز موقف جبهة التحرير الوطني في انتخابات عام ٢٠١٢. وجاء كل من حزبيَ جبهة التحرير الوطني والتجمع الوطني الديمقراطي مسيطرين على المقاعد (٢٧٦ – ٤٦٢)، وبالتالي خلق أغلبية برلمان من دون إسلاميين.

<div dir="rtl">

**الجدول الرقم (٥-١)**
**نتائج الانتخابات البرلمانية (١٩٩٧ – ٢٠١٢)**

| ٢٠١٢ | ٢٠٠٧ | ٢٠٠٢ | ١٩٩٧ | الأحزاب – المقاعد |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ٢٠٨ | ١٣٦ | ١٩٩ | ٦٩ | جبهة التحرير الوطني |
| ٦٨ | ٦١ | ٤٧ | ١٥٦ | التجمع الوطني الديمقراطي |
| – | ٣ | ٤٣ | –– | الإصلاح |
| – | ٥٢ | ٣٨ | ٦٩ | حمس |
| – | ٥ | ١ | ٣٤ | النهضة |
| ٤٩ | – | – | – | تحالف الجزائر الخضراء (حمس، حزب الإصلاح، النهضة) |
| ٢٤ | ٢٦ | ٢١ | ٤ | حزب العمال |
| ٢٧ | –– | –– | ٢٠ | جبهة القوى الاشتراكية |
| ١٩ | ٣٣ | ٣٠ | ١١ | الأحرار |
| ٧ | - | - | - | جبهة من أجل العدالة والتنمية FJD / Addala |
| | | –– | ١٩ | RCD(التجمع من أجل الثقافة والديمقراطية) |

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(٣٢) Christian Lowe and LamineChikhi, «Algeria Ruling Party Snubs Arab Spring To Win Election,» Reuters, May 11, 2012.

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ملاحظة: عدد المقاعد في الجمعية الوطنية كان٣٨٠ في عام ١٩٩٧،٣٨٩ في عام ٢٠٠٢ و٤٦٢ في عام ٢٠١٢؛ تأسس/ (MNR) الإصلاح في عام ١٩٩٨، قاطعت (RCD) انتخابات عام ٢٠٠٢ و٢٠١٢، في حين أن جبهة القوى الاشتراكية قاطعت التصويت في عام ٢٠٠٢ وفي عام ٢٠٠٧. تحالف الجزائر الخضراء، هو تحالف جديد من ثلاثة أحزاب إسلامية (حمس، التجمع اليمني للإصلاح، وحزب النهضة) الذي قدم قائمة مشتركة من المرشحين. (FJD) هو حزب عبد الله جاب الله.

حتى وقت كتابة هذا الفصل، لم يهيأ البرلمان بعد. كان أحد الأسئلة المطروحة انطلاقاً من نتائج الانتخابات والخلافات التي ولّدتها (حول التزوير وعدم الانتظام)، هو ما يمكن أن يحدث للأحزاب الإسلامية من تحالف الجزائر الخضراء الذي حصل على٤٩ مقعداً فقط؟ صدمت أحزاب التحالف الإسلامي التي كانت تأمل في فوز مماثل لفوز الإسلاميين المحقق في المنطقة عندما نشرت النتائج، حيث يتهم قادتها الحكومة بتزوير الانتخابات. شكّل عبد الله جاب الله، زعيم حزب إسلامي تم إنشاؤه حديثاً، جبهة العدالة والتنمية (Addala / FJD)، والفائز بـ٧ مقاعد فقط، جنباً إلى جنب مع ١٥ من زعماء الأحزاب الآخرين، الجبهة السياسية لصيانة الديمقراطية (FPSD). دعا (FPSD) الأحزاب إلى مقاطعة البرلمان الذي كانت نتائجه مثيرة للجدل، وطالب بتشكيل حكومة انتقالية، وإنشاء هيئة وطنية خاصة لوضع دستور جديد. وكان جاب الله في كلمة ألقاها في شباط/فبراير ٢٠١٢ قد صرح: «أنه يجب على السلطة الجزائرية أن تأخذ العِبَر من «الربيع العربي» الذي أسقط من خلاله الشباب الطغاة الذين اعتُقد خلودهم. إذا لم تكن ترغب في ملاقاة مصير أنظمة زين العابدين ومبارك، فإن عليها الرضوخ لمطالب الشعب الذي صودر منذ عام ١٩٦٢»(٣٣).

لا تملك أحزاب الـ (FPSD) الستة عشر دوائر انتخابية كبيرة، وليس لها أي ثقل سياسي، وبذلك من غير المحتمل أن يكون لعملهم أو دعواهم أي أثر في مجرى الأحداث الذي تصممه القيادة العليا للبلاد. هذا لا يستبعد تضمين بعضهم من قبل الحكومة في جهودها للحفاظ على مظهر التعددية السياسية العام والسيطرة على المعارضة القوية في البرلمان.

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(٣٣) Abdallah Djaballah,quoted in Kamel Beniaiche, «Abdallah Djaballah: 'Même les morts ont des cartes d'électeur en Algérie',» *El Watan*, February 26, 2012. (translation mine)

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يكمن خطر المعارضة السياسية الجامحة، وربما عدم الاستقرار، في مكان آخر خارج المؤسسات الرسمية. إنه يكمن في الشوارع، حيث يمكن تحدي الوضع الراهن. وينعكس هذا بوضوح في الإضرابات وأعمال الشغب العديدة التي تجري على مدار السنة في أنحاء البلاد كلها بكثافة متزايدة. بسبب غلق بقايا منافذ المحيط المؤسسي على المعارضة السياسية والاحتجاج، اتخذ الناس زمام الأمور على عاتقهم.

في واحد من أفضل أعماله، حذّرنا صاموئيل ب. هانتنغتون في عام ١٩٦٨ في **النظام السياسي في المجتمعات المتغيرة** من المشاكل التي يمكن أن تتولّد من تأخر تطور المؤسسات السياسية في البلدان التي تشهد تغيراً اجتماعياً واقتصادياً سريعين، بقوله: «العنف وعدم الاستقرار» يمكن أن يكون في جزء كبير «نتاج التغير الاجتماعي السريع، والتعبئة السريعة لمجموعات جديدة في السياسة إلى جانب بطء تطور المؤسسات السياسية»[٣٤]. تغيرت الجزائر خلال العقدين الأخيرين على صعيدين، وبخاصة مجتمعها، حيث يستبدل جيلٌ جديد جيلَ ما بعد الاستقلال. كما أشار عالم الاجتماع الجزائري ناصر جابي في دراسة أجريت حول الأهمية السياسية لتحوُّل الأجيال في الجزائر، أن انشغالات الجيل الحالي هي أكثر اقتصادية واجتماعية منها من الاهتمامات الأيديولوجية والسياسية. لا يبدو لهذا الجيل أي رغبة في خوض المعارك الأيديولوجية من الماضي، ومنشغل أكثر بتلبية حاجاته الخاصة على الفور من حيث التعليم، وفرص العمل، والسكن، والحراك الاجتماعي[٣٥]. إنه أكثر استعداداً أيضاً للقتال من أجل هذه الاحتياجات خارج الإطار المؤسسي الفاشل.

باستخدام منطق هانتنغتون، يمكن القول إنه لم يقابَل التوسع في المشاركة السياسية في الجزائر في أواخر الثمانينات نتيجة الطفرة الاجتماعية والاقتصادية والتحرر السياسي على حد سواء بالمستوى المطلوب من التأسيس

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Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, (Yale University (٣٤) Press: 2006 [1968]), p. 4.

Abdel Nasser Jaby, «The Impasse of Political Transition in Algeria: Three (٣٥) Generations and Two Scenarios,» *Research Paper Series*, (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Doha, Qatar, April 212). Online at: <http://english.dohainstitute.org/>. Consulted on May 19, 2012.

السياسي. وأدى التباين بين توسيع المشاركة السياسية وانخفاض مستوى التأسيس السياسي إلى «عدم الاستقرار السياسي والفوضى».(٣٦)» باختصار، ضعف مستوى التأسيس السياسي قد يكون بالتالي واحداً من الأسباب التي تجعل «الشارع أكثر أهمية من فشل المؤسسات التمثيلية وصنع السياسة العامة».

يُعبّر الناس عن إحباطهم من الدولة وقيادتها من خلال مظاهرات الشوارع وأعمال الشغب، بدلاً من توجيه هذه المطالب والمظالم من خلال المؤسسات السياسية. «بالنسبة إلى العديد من الجزائريين إغلاق الطريق، وحرق الإطارات، وإغلاق المباني الرسمية، والمشاركة في مسيرة احتجاج، أو أي إجراء آخر هو عمل سياسي. ومهدت الطريق لأكثر من عام، حيث تتم حركات الاحتجاج يومياً. هذا يعني أن كل الأعمال سياسية تجري في الشارع»(٣٧). ومع ذلك، وكما ذُكر آنفاً، تُعَدْ هذه الأعمال محدودة ومعزولة وعادة تحدث لمدة قصيرة. لا يملك معظمها شعارات سياسية. يحركها الطلب على خدمات المياه وانخفاض الدخل والإسكان والوظائف وعقود العمل الجديدة ومسائل أخرى مشابهة. عندما يتم تلبية بعض هذه المطالب بضخ كمية جديدة من المال العام، عادة ما تنتهي الاحتجاجات. بالطبع، يمكن هذا الوضع أن يدوم لفترة طويلة، بخاصة إذا هبطت أسعار النفط والغاز، ولم تعد الدولة قادرة على الوفاء بالتزاماتها بشكل كامل.

تجنّب سياسة الدولة في إخماد النار الواحدة تلو الأخرى (دور الإطفائي) مسألة مناقشة ضرورة عقد اجتماعي جديد بين الدولة والمجتمع. أدى نقص السبل السلمية والمناسبات العادية أو ذات الطابع المؤسسي للتفاعل بين الدولة والمجتمع حول السياسات العامة، إضافة إلى عدم الثقة والشك، إلى خلق هوّة بين النخبة الحاكمة والمواطنين، باستثناء اشتباكات عنيفة في بعض الأحيان الناجمة في الواقع من هذا التباعد. على المرء فقط أن ينظر إلى استطلاعات الرأي الأخيرة التي أجريت في الجزائر لمعرفة مدى الفصل الموجود اليوم بين المجتمع، وبخاصة المكون من الشباب، والمؤسسات

(٣٦) Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, op. cit., p. 5.

(٣٧) Karim Aimeur, «Ne voulant pas des structures officielles les Algériens font la politique autrement,» L'Expression, Wednesday, January 18, 2012. Online at: < www.lexpression dz.com >, Consulted on June 6, 2012.

الحاكمة والقيادة. إذ أظهر مسح أجراه المؤشر العربي في شهري نيسان/أبريل وأيار/مايو ٢٠١١، أن ما نسبته ٦٢ في المئة من أفراد العيّنة غير راضين عن عمل الحكومة. أكثر من ٥٠ في المئة لا يثقون بالأحزاب السياسية على الإطلاق، وعلى مقربة من ٣٠ في المئة لا يثقون بالجمعيات المدنية. وأشار المسح إلى أن ٥٤ في المئة من أفراد العيّنة لا يثقون بالنظام القضائي [٣٨].

تعكس اللامبالاة وعدم الثقة تجاه المؤسسات السياسية والعمليات عجزاً كبيراً في الشرعية التي لا يمكن تجاهلها لفترة طويلة، أو نفيها بمساعدة الإنفاق الشعبوي الذي يعتمد على إيجار النفط والغاز. يمكن تفاقم الأمور بسهولة إذا كان هناك انخفاض كبير في واردات النفط والغاز الطبيعي، أو ارتكبت الدولة وعملاؤها خطأ جسيماً قد يكون بمثابة الشرارة التي من شأنها أن تشعل تمرداً مسلّحاً من المرجح أن يكون أسوأ بكثير من ذلك الذي قاده الإسلاميون. للأسف، بسبب غياب الصدمة، من المرجح أن يستمر النظام بحكمه لفترة أطول، حتى إنه يتوقع كثيرون من المراقبين أن تُدخِل الانتخابات الرئاسية المقبلة في عام ٢٠١٤ بديلاً فقط من الرئيس بوتفليقة.

يصعب إدراك «استثنائية» الجزائر على المدى المتوسط في أعقاب ربع الثورات التي هزت المنطقة. لتجنّب انفجار شبه مؤكد، فإن البلد يحتاج إلى إصلاح حقيقي للمؤسسات، وتغيير حقيقي للقيادة المدنية على المستويات كلها، وإدخال إصلاحات اقتصادية سليمة تهدف إلى تقليل الاعتماد الكبير على بيع المحروقات، والقضاء على السلوك المفترس لأصحاب المناصب العسكرية على المدنيين، واستيعاب مئات الآلاف من الشباب الباحثين عن عمل. للجزائر العديد من العوامل التي يمكن أن تساعد في التحول الإيجابي للدولة في مصلحة مواطنيها. تشمل هذه العوامل ثراء الموارد الطبيعية؛ وعلو مستوى الدخل والصادرات من الاحتياطيات النقدية؛ وجود نخبة حصلت على تعليم عالٍ، وقوة كبيرة من التكنوقراطيين؛ ازدهار الصحافة المطبوعة المستقلة والمشهد السياسي متعدد الأحزاب الذي يمكن الزيادة من جدواه من خلال دمقرطته.

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(٣٨) تم الاستناد في أرقام المؤشر العربي إلى:

Fayçal Metaoui et Mehdi Bsikri, «Démocratie, gouvernement, religion, partis, économie, citoyenneté: Ce que pensent les Algériens,» El Watan, January 17, 2012. Consulted on June 6, 2012.

يمكن استغلال هذه الأصول بأحسن وجه إذا ما تم إجراء تغييرات مؤسسية مهمة. هناك حاجة إلى إعادة النظر في صلاحيات كل مؤسسات الدولة من أجل إنهاء هيمنة مكتب الرئاسة غير المنتج، والسماح للبرلمان بممارسة مهامه التشريعية ومهام التحقيق والرقابة، والدفع باستقلالية النظام القضائي فعلياً لأنه الوحيد القادر على ضمان الحريات الأساسية والحماية من تعسُّف السلطة والانتقام لأسباب سياسية. يجب أن يتقلص دور الجيش في السياسة[39] إلى حدٍّ ما تحت ضغط الرئيس بوتفليقة، حتى يسمح ذلك بالمساءلة، وبالتناوب بشكل منتظم، لتمكين القادة المدنيين من توجيه البلاد نحو التنمية السياسية والاقتصادية الحقيقيتين. حتى إذا كانت هناك نيّة في سن هذه التعديلات، لن تجرى هذه التدابير بين عشية وضحاها، لكن من الضروري أن تبدأ مساعي الإصلاح الشامل الآن مع الأمل في أن تساعد في تجنب وقوع الانفجار شبه المؤكد الذي سينهي الاستثناء الجزائري في حقبة من التغيرات الشاملة في المنطقة والعالم. وبما أنه ليس من المرجح أن يبادَر بالتغيير من أعلى، على المجتمع أن يتخذ زمام الأمور من خلال دفع جبهة ديمقراطية واسعة ومستمرة استناداً إلى توافق الآراء بين معظم القوى على المعايير الأساسية مثل احترام النظام الدستوري وسيادة القانون والتسامح وتعارض وجهات النظر وتغيير القيادة بصفة منتظمة عن طريق الانتخابات، ومساءلة جميع شاغلي المناصب.

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(39) من الناحية الرسمية فإن المؤسسة العسكرية ملتزمة بالمشروع الديمقراطي والحكم الجمهوري مع ذلك، فإن معظم الناس يرونها العمود الفقري للنظام السياسي الجزائري، حيث تؤدي دور «صانع الملك»، تتولى الأمن والاستقرار في البلاد، ولها مكانة لا تعادلها مكانة أي طرف آخر في مؤسسات الدولة العليا.